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of-use#LAAIN PURSUIT  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE
RIGHTS:  ONE  VIEW  OF  RAWLS'
THEORY  OF  JUSTICE
FRANK  I.  MICHELMANt
A  Theory  of  Justice'  is  a  remarkable  book.  It  is  learned  and
ambitious, deep  (though multileveled),  subtle  (though lucid),  rich and
complex. It  has been received  with favor and  fanfare by distinguished
philosophical  critics.2 Its topic can hardly be  disdained by devotees  of
the law.
Some  books  are  like  cathedrals.  Depth,  subtlety,  richness  and
complexity  may retard  comprehension  however  much  they  reward  it
ultimately.  It  is  impossible  to  grasp  and  absorb  this  book's  architec-
tonic, hence  its meaning,  by simply reading it  through no matter how
studiously.  Some sort  of  focused  interrogative  strategy  may help  one
come  to  grips  with  Professor  Rawls'  monumental  utterance.  I  have
chosen  to  seek  understanding  through  this  not-so-philosophical  ques-
tion:  How  does  the  book  bear  upon  the  work  of  legal  investigators
concerned  or  curious  about  recognition,  through  legal  processes,  of
claimed  affirmative  rights  (let  us  call them  "welfare  rights")  to  edu-
cation, shelter,  subsistence,  health  care and  the like, or to the money
these  things cost?
3
On  the  face  of  it,  the  bearing  would  appear  to  be  direct  and
profound.  An  apparent  main  purpose  of  Rawls'  book  is  to  advance
and  clarify  discourse  about  claims  respecting  distribution,  transfer,
and provision  of social goods including material social  goods-income,
wealth,  and  what  you  can buy  with  them.  Opinion  abounds  (Rawls
evidently shares it)4  that our society is marked by evident  and severe
distributive  injustice.  Followers  of  the  law  may  fairly  worry  about
seeming disconnection  between  our  ingrained  notions  of  a legal  order
and  these  urgent,  if  debatable,5  questions  of  distributive  justice-at
least insofar as we mean by "distributive justice"  an outcome-oriented
tProfessor  of  Law,  Harvard  Unversity.  BA.  1957,  Yale  University;  LL.B.  1960,
Harvard  University.
1 J.  RAwr.s,  A THEORY  o  JUSTICE  (1971)  [hereinafter  cited  as  RAWLS]. 2E.g.,  Hampshire,  A  New  Philosophy for the Jist Society,  N.Y.  REv.  or  Booxs,
Feb.  24,  1972.
8 I  shall  have  in  mind  mostly  claims  against  "sovereign"  legislatures,  or  against
their  agents  or  instrumentalities.
4 RAWLS  87.
5 See, e.g.,  Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29  PUB.  INTmRsT  29  (1972).
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appraisal  of  the  pattern  and  makeup  of  distributive  "shares"  pre-
cipitated  by  economic,  political,  and  other  societal  processes,  as  dis-
tinguished from concern for the correctness of the processes themselves
or  the purity  of their  application.  For it can hardly be  doubted that
the  mainstream  of  our  legal tradition  has  largely  bypassed  the  out-
come-appraising sort of distributional concern. Lawyers and jurists, like
economists  and political  scientists,  seem  to  have  instinctively  placed
distributive-share  questions  beyond  the  province  of  their  specialized
analysis,  "science,"  and  technique.'  They work  under  a paradigm  of
legal  order  which  is  noticeably  lacking  in  norms,  principles,  and
categories  of analysis  directly applicable  to the  evaluation  of  distribu-
tional  outcomes.  The  notion of  justice  inhabiting  that  paradigm  has
been essentially  corrective  and regulative,  stabilizing and  preservative
-if  not of  any extant  distributional  configuration,  then  of  an  extant
framework  of procedures  and practices  within which distributions  are
secreted.  Insofar  as  the legal  system  and its  operatives  have  not ab-
stained  entirely  from  the  distributive-share  thicket,  their  modern
forays  into  it have  often  and  to  many  appeared  fitful,  unprincipled,
and  apologetic.7
Perhaps  the legal order's failure to deal confidently  with distribu-
tive  share  questions  betrays  an  underlying,  widely shared  (if  uneasy
and often unacknowledged)  conviction  that a good  distribution is  un-
knowable  except  as the actual historical  outcome of a good procedure
-that  justice consists precisely in abiding the outcome  of  a just pro-
cedure,  and  injustice  in  corruption  of  the  procedure  or  refusal  to
accept its results.'  Even if some  philosophers  can rise above that  con-
viction,  there  may  conceivably  be  other  considerations  endemic  in  a
"proper"  (or  optimally  useful)  idea  of  a  legal  order  which  could
explain  its lack  of  focus  on issues  of  distributive-share  justice.  Most
plausibly, public acceptance-presumably  an essential  trait of  a legal
order-might  be  felt  to  depend  on  the  system's  finding  refuge  in
"neutral"  procedures  from evident authorship  of particular outcomes.9
6 See  Tribe,  Policy  Science: Analysis  or  Ideology,  2  Pm..  & PuB.  AxnRs  66,  82
(1972).
7 See,  e.g.,  Schoettie,  The Equal Protection Clause in  Public Education, 71  Covonr.
L.  REv.  1355,  1416-18  (1971),  and  opinions  cited  therein.  See  also  Winter,  Poverty,
Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972  SuP.  CT. REV.  41.
8  A complete  theory and argument  along these lines  is  under preparation by  Professor
Robert  Nozick.  His  forthcoming  Anarchy, State,  and Utopia will  criticize  Rawls'  work
from  just  this standpoint.
9 Tribe,  supra note  6,  at  82, suggests  another  explanation  for  "proceduralism"  in
legal  thought:  that  it "has  served  largely  as  an  'economic'  vehicle  of  concern  for  end-
result  maximization"--i.e.,  the  procedures  have  been  justified  "in  terms  of  their  sup-
posed  tendency  to  maximize  aggregate  satisfaction  in the  end.'  This  interpretation  con-
verges with  the  one  in the text in its suggestion  of  unconcern  with  distributive  shares  as
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Yet neither  explanation  of the legal order's  preoccupation  with  proce-
dural justice is fully satisfactory if it can be shown that some outcome-
evaluative principles  are accepted more  or less consensually  in society,
even  if  only intuitively and  abstractly.  If  there  are  such  latent  con-
sensual notions  of justice in distributive  shares, if these  are ostensibly
dishonored  by  society's  economic  and  political  institutions,  and  if
these  failures are in turn ignored by the legal organs, then there might
be  cause  for  concern  about  continued  public  acceptance  of  the  total
system-though not necessarily reason  to conclude that  it  is the legal
organs  that have  failed,  or  through  which the  way  to salvation  now
lies.
Now  Rawls presents  an argument  calculated  to persuade  us that
such  outcome-oriented  notions  of  distributive-share  justice  do  indeed
exist.  He  tries  to  show  how  "our"  introspectively  detected  "moral
capacity"  or  "sense  of justice"--meaning  the whole  set of  our day-to-
day moral  judgments  together  with  the supporting  reasons  we  would
tend  to give  (our  "considered  judgements")-can  be  parsimoniously
captured  in  a few  abstract  statements  (the  "principles  of  justice").o
These principles  are connected up with a few  other weak and  broadly
acceptable  posits  (those  governing  the  "original  position")"  by  a
striking and appealing  (contractarian)  form of  argument, designed  to
show that they are the principles which would be unanimously adopted
by persons  of whose traits  and situation  those  posits were  true.'2  The
'oThe  definitive  statement  of  the  principles  may  be  found  in  note  23  infra.
1'Persons  in  the  original  position  are  assumed  to  be  (a)  mutually  disinterested,
being  neither  envious  of  nor  dependent upon  one  another's  well-being,  RAwLs  143,  281,
538, and  (b)  rational,  meaning  that their  happiness  is  determined  by  success in  carrying
out  a  long-term  plan  of  life  "designed  to  permit  the  harmonious  satisfaction  of  ...
interests" by  "schedul~ing]  activities  so  that various  desires  can be  fulfilled without inter-
ference."  Id. 93.  Such  persons  prefer  for  themselves  more  rather  than  less  of  the  social
"primary  goods"-"rights  and  liberties,  opportunities  and  powers,  income  and  wealth,"
and "a sense of  one's own worth'--required  for  carrying out such plans. Id. 92.  They  are
formal and  moral  equals  with  regard  to  their  claims  to  participate  and have  their  views
counted, id.  19,  a  condition  made  operative  in  the original  position  by  a  requirement  of
unanimous  agreement  on  the  principles  of  justice,  id.  141-42.  And  they  are  equals  with
respect  to  their  claims  to  happiness  or  success  in  carrying  out  their  plans,  a  condition
made  operative  by  the supposition that  they  deliberate  under  a  "veil  of ignorance"  as  to
their actual,  particular  circumstances,  and  by  the  associated  requirements  that  any  prin-
ciples  of  justice  selected  be  general  and  universal.  Id. 131-33.
12 The  following  paragraph seems to capture  much  of the essence of  the contractarian
approach:
[Flor  one who  understands  and  accepts  the  contract  doctrine,  the  sentiment  of
justice  is  not a different  desire  from that to  act on principles  that rational indi-
viduals  would  consent  to  in  an  initial  situation  which  gives  everyone  equal
representation  as  a moral  person.  Nor is it different  from  wanting  to  act  in ac-
cordance  with  principles  that  express  men's  nature  as  free  and  equal  rational
beings.  The  principles  of  justice  answer  to  these  descriptions  and  this  fact
allows  us  to  give  an  acceptable  interpretation  to  the  sense  of  justice.  In  the
light  of  the  theory  of  justice  we  understand  how  the  moral  sentiments  can  be
regulative  in  our life  and have  the  role  attributed  to  them  by the  formal  con-
ditions  on  moral  principles.  Being  governed  by  these  principles  means  that  weCONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE RIGHTS
whole  scheme-abstractly  stated  principles  embedded  in  their  con-
tractarian  derivation-composes  a "moral  theory"  which  is supposed
to  impart  a  sense  of  system  to  the  day-to-day,  intuitive  considered
judgments  we  already  have. Rawls  evidently  expects  that "our"  con-
sidered judgments will  turn out to be on the whole, but not uniformly,
consistent with  the philosophically  elaborated  moral  theory. Thus the
moral theory-insofar  as  successful-can  serve  to  clarify  our  under-
standing of,  and  strengthen  our  commitment  to,  our  day-to-day  con-
sidered judgments  and can also  serve,  through its  own  coherence  and
general  consistency  with  our  more  casual  sense  of  justice,  to  alter
those day-to-day judgments at least'marginally. We can test the theory
by the closeness of its fit to our judgments, after those have undergone
adjustment  in light  of exposure  to  the theory-what  Rawls  calls  our
judgments in "reflective  equilibrium."'3
The theory is thus expressly aimed at bringing out and systematiz-
ing moral  notions which  are supposed to be  already  implanted in the
bulk of  the book's  readership.  Moreover,  the  suggested  principles  of
justice, while relying in part on elements  of "pure procedural justice,"
do ultimately  demand, in addition,  appraisal  of  outcomes.'4  And these
principles, and the arguments  supporting them, appear to proceed from
the  broad  tradition  of  "western"  individualistic  democratic  liberalism
want to  live with others  on  terms  that everyone  would  recognize  as  fair from  a
perspective  that all would accept  as  reasonable.  The ideal  of persons  cooperating
on  this  basis  exercises  a  natural attraction  upon  our  affections.
Id.  478.
13 For  discussion  of  the  mutual  adjustment  of  principles  and  considered  judgments,
and  the  resultant  state  of  reflective  equilibrium,  see  id.  19-22,  46-52,  579.
1
4 See,  e.g.,  id.  507-08. "[P]ure  procedural  justice,"  says Rawls,  "obtains  when there
is  no  independent  criterion  for  the  right  result:  instead  there  is  a  correct  or  fair  pro-
cedure  such  that the  outcome  is  likewise  correct  or  fair,  whatever  it  is,  provided  that
the procedure  has  been properly  followed."  Id.  86.
The  interaction  in  Raws'  theory  between  a "pure  procedural"  orientation  and  an
"outcome"  or  "substantive  justice"  orientation  is  complex  and  quite  fascinating.  The
original  position  can  itself  be  regarded  as  a  procedure  so  constructed  that  whatever
principles  emerge  will  be  ipso  facto  "just"--the  idea,  as  Rawls  says,  being  "to  use  the
notion  of  pure  procedural  justice  as  a  basis  of  theory."  Id.  136.  Yet  the  procedure  is
deliberately  constructed  so  that  it  will  yield  principles  generally  conforming  to  what-
ever  substantive  notions  we  start  with,  id.  19-20--such  as  those  of  moral  and  formal
equality,  mentioned  in note  11  supra. Of course, the  rabbit  that goes  in  the hat is,  how-
ever  transformed  by  contractarian  magic,  the  rabbit  that  comes  out;  and  just  as  the
original  position  is  a  procedure  both  cherished  for  its  own  procedural  sake  and  con-
strained  by substantive  notions  of  freedom  and  equality,  so  is  the  social  system  implied
by  the  resulting principles  of  justice:
The  intuitive  idea  is  familiar.  Suppose  that law  and  government  act effectively
to keep markets  competitive,  resources fully  employed,  property and  wealth  . . .
widely  distributed  . . . , and  to  guarantee  a  reasonable social  minimum.  Assume
also  that there  is  fair equality  of opportunity underwritten  by  education  for  all;
and  that  the  other  equal  liberties  are  secured.  Then  it  would  appear  that  the
resulting  distribution  . . . will tend to satisfy  the difference principle  [paragraph
(a)  of the Second  Principle of Justice, note  23  infra]. In this complex  of institu-
tions,  which  we  think  of  as  establishing  social  justice  in  the  modem state,  the
advantages  of  the  better  situated  improve  the  conditions  of  the  least  favored.
RAwLs  87.
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within  which  our  characteristic  notions  of  legal  order  and  doctrine
have  arisen.:"
One can thus well imagine that constitutional lawyers and scholars,
seeking  or  weighing  legal  definition,  recognition,  and  enforcement  of
welfare  rights, would  eagerly take  to Rawls  in search  of a  principled
account  of such rights-one which could be used  to support or explain
such legal  events  (actual  or desired)  as  inclusion  of  specific  welfare
guaranties  in a constitution0  or  determinations  by the  judiciary  that
some such guaranties  are already present in the  spacious locutions  of,
say, section one of the fourteenth  amendment.YT
By  a  "specific  welfare guaranty"  (or,  as  I  shall  sometimes  say,
an  "insurance  right")  I  mean  a  right to provision  for a  certain  need
-on  the  order  of  shelter,  education,  medical  care-as  and  when  it
accrues.  I  put the  matter  this  way  even  though,  as  will  appear,  it is
easier and  more  natural  to  find in  Rawls  support  for  more  generally
formulated  rights  to  guaranteed  money  income  at some  fixed  or  cal-
culable  rate  (e.g.,  not  less  than  half  the  median  income),  or-more
generally  still-for  rights  against  excessive  or  unnecessary  inequality
of wealth  or  income.  But as long  as one  is asking what  Rawls  has to
contribute  to  the  promotion  of  welfare  rights  that  are  justiciable-
that  is,  susceptible  of  convincing  recognition  and  enforcement  by
officers  acting  subject  to  the  restraints  of  judicial  office-the  special
focus  on insurance  rights  seems at  least provisionally  in order.  How-
ever strange may  seem the  nomination  of  welfare  insurance  rights  as
early candidates  for direct  judicial  recognition  as  components  of, say,
due  process  or equal  protection,  most  of  us  will  feel  intuitively  that
constitutional  minimum-income  rights  are less likely still.' 8 A like tac-
tical  preference  for  insurance  rights  may  seem  less  clear-cut  when
1' The  names  of  Aristotle,  Kant,  J.S.  Mill,  and  Sidgwick  are  especially  prominent.
For  a  discussion  of  Rawls'  affirmance  of  this  liberal  tradition,  see  McBride,  Social
Theory Sub  Specie  Aeternitatis:  A  New  Perspective, 81  YALE  L..  980,  987-90,  993-95
(1972).
9o An  example  of  a  proposed  inclusion  of  welfare  guaranties  in  a  state  constitution
appears in  Morris,  New Horizons For a State Bill of  Rights, 45  WAsH.  L.  Rav. 474, 490
(1970):
Art.  XXVII. State Responsibility To Protect Social And  Economic Rights. The
State  of Washington  through  its  legislature  and  other  divisions  of  government
shall foster the health  and welfare  of  its citizens, through  a partnership  of public
agencies  and  voluntary  organizations  wherever  practicable,  by  providing:  care
for  the helpless,  the  needy, and  the sick;  protection  against  physical  and mental
illness;  conditions  encouraging  maximum  realization  of  the  individual's  inde-
pendence;  freedom  from  discrimination,  unemployment,  and  the  anxieties  of
old  age;  personal  safety;  and  decent  housing,  recreation  facilities  and  aesthetic
surroundings.
17 See,  e.g.,  Michelman,  Foreword: On  Protecting the  Poor Through  the  Four-
teenth Amendment,  83  1IRv. L.  REv.  7, 14-16  (1969).  The cited  article  should  be  com-
pared  with the  vigorous  criticism  of it found  in Winter, supra note  7.
18 See  Michelman,  supra note  17,  at  14.CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE RIGHTS
constitutional  amendment  is  the  chosen  avenue  of  reform  (and  a
minimum-income  guaranty, once  ensconced  in  a constitution,  need by
no means be less justiciable than a guaranty of, say, "decent shelter");
but I  believe  there  are  reasons  why  insurance  rights might  be  more
attractive  than  minimum  income  rights  to  devotees  of  constitutional
amendment.  These reasons  will emerge  from  subsequent  discussion.19
None  of  the  above  is  to  assert  finally  that  justiciable  welfare
rights  are a good  thing, and certainly  not  to deny  that "rights"  may
be  recognized  and  made  influential  in  societal  affairs  otherwise  than
through  adjudication.  It  is  simply  that  the  task  I  have  chosen  is  to
see what can be learned of  Rawls by searching  in his book  for justici-
able welfare  rights. Like any other heuristic  device,  this  one will have
to be judged by its results. And,  of course, it is  just possible that the
experience  of  the  search  will  teach  us  something  about  whether
justiciable  welfare  rights  ought  to  be  pursued  at  all.
Numerous questions, arising in various perspectives  and at various
levels,  stand between  us  and  a final  appraisal  of  what,  if  anything,
Rawls'  theory  has  to  contribute  to  a  legal  conception  of  justiciable
welfare  rights.  It  may help  at this  point  to  chart  these  questions  in
their broadest  outlines.
To  begin  with, we have  to  note  that  Rawls  is mainly  concerned
with what he calls "ideal theory"-the  selection, defense,  and working
out of principles  of justice for and in the supposed context of a society
which is  "well-ordered"  or in  a state  of  "near  justice."  The  crucial
assumption  of ideal theory  is that the  principles  of  justice  (whatever
ones are under examination)  are generally and explicitly acknowledged,
accepted,  and on the whole applied in the society. It is on that assump-
tion that the implications and consequences of the principles are worked
out and appraised.
This feature  of  Rawls'  work immediately  suggests  a  major  divi-
sion  for  our exploration.  We  should  first  try to discover  whether  and
to  what  extent the  ideal theory  itself  (that  is,  the  theory  as  worked
out  for a society supposed  to  be well-ordered  by the  very criteria  it
implies)  suggests  welfare  rights  that  are  judicially  enforceable.  But
we must  then  consider whether our  society is  well-ordered  (or  poten-
tially  well-ordered)  in  the  indicated  sense,  and  if  not,  what  then
follows.  For a  theory which  suggests  justiciable  welfare  rights  for  a
society  which  is  well-ordered  might  lead  to  different  conclusions  for
one  which  is  not.  Conversely,  and  perhaps  more  important,  it  may
19 See  text  accompanying  notes  120-21  inf  ra.
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turn out that  even if  the  theory does  not indicate  justiciable  welfare
rights under  ideal conditions, it suggests them as a way of coping with
nonideal conditions.
Focusing,  then,  on  ideal  theory,  we  encounter  a  second  major
division of inquiry. We want to know, of course, whether the principles
of  justice  have  a  substantive  content  which  points  to  welfare  rights
and,  if so,  what  specific  shape  these  rights  might  take;  but we  need
to ask also whether the theory contemplates that any such rights would
be set forth in  a written constitution  and  (a  different  though  related
question)  whether they would  be enforceable  in the  face of legislative
failure by judicial review. The same  duality of "substance"  and "pro-
cedure"  will help  organize  our pursuit  of the  theory into its  nonideal
applications.
Lurking  behind  all  this  is  still  another  major  inquiry.  Even  if
we  decide  that Rawls'  theory  suggests,  for  our  society  (well-ordered
or  not as the  case  may  be),  the  constitutionalization  and judicial  en-
forcement  of  welfare  rights,  we  shall  have  to  consider  what  claims
this  theory  might  have  to  govern  or  influence  the  decisions  of  our
judges.  This  last  question-whether,  how,  or  why  Professor  Rawls'
Theory  of  Justice,  any  more  or  less  than  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's
Social Statics, 20  is  to  become  an  operative  force  in  constitutional  ad-
judication-will  be explored in the  last part of  this  essay.
I.  IDEAL  THEORY
A.  Substantive Content
1.  The  Notion  of  the  Basic  Structure
One  must  consider  first  the  level  of  generality  at  which  Rawls
formulates  his theory  of justice  as  fairness.  That theory  proposes  to
address  only
the  basic  structure  of  society,  or  more  exactly,  the  way  in
which  the  major  social  institutions  distribute  fundamental
rights  and  duties  and  determine  the  division  of  advantages
from social cooperation  ....  The intuitive notion here is that
this structure  contains  various  social positions  and  that  men
born into different positions have different expectations  of life
determined,  in  part,  by  the  political  system  as  well  as  by
economic and social circumstances ....  It  is these  inequalities
•..  to which the principles  of justice must in the first instance
apply. These  principles,  then, regulate  the choice  of a politi-
20 See  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.S.  45,  74,  75  (1905)  (Holmes,  J.,  dissenting).CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
cal constitution  and  the main  elements  of  the economic  and
social  system.
21
The notion  of the basic structure  may be crucial  to the  welfare-rights
search,  for  it contains  what  may be  the  most  persuasive  line  of  re-
sponse  to the most compelling  line of objection to welfare  rights, that
such  rights  signify  redistribution  from  the  prudent  and  industrious
to  those  who  have  culpably  failed  to  grasp  opportunities  to  provide
for their  own security. The notion  of  the basic structure  suggests  the
possibility that society now contains a correctible shortage of economi-
cally secure positions (or an excess of insecure ones);  and welfare rights
can then be appraised  as a possible  corrective  device.
At  the  same  time, the  focus  of  justice  as  fairness  on  the  basic
structure  may  pose  difficulties  for  the  welfare-rights  search.  This
focus  means  that  the  theory's  principles  of  justice  are  selected  for
their  capacity  to  serve  as  rather  abstract,  broad-gauged  constraints
against  which  to  test  more  specific  and  circumstantially  contingent
proposals  at the  constitutional  and  legislative  levels.  And  insofar  as
the  recognition  and  specific  content  of  welfare  rights  may,  within
these  constraints,  vary  according  to  societal  circumstances  and  how
other  available  choices  (regarding  the  basic  structure)  are  made,  a
justiciable  catalogue  of  welfare  rights  cannot  directly  appear.  One
might, though, be rather strongly and clearly implied once the relevant
circumstances  and  other  choices  for  our  particular  society  are  re-
vealed and plugged in. This is the possibility we must pursue.
2.  Managing  the  Tension  Between  Liberty  and  Equality
It  is  no  longer  possible  to  avoid  an  attempt,  however  lame,  to
expound  in some way the  substance  of  the  theory we  are  to  explore.
I shall do this by examining  a question which is peripherally  relevant
to my main  inquiry here,  and  of some  general  interest:  the way  the
theory  manages  the  familiar  tension  between  liberty  and  equality.
Now creditable  handling of this  issue involves  either resolution of  the
tension or,  admitting  that the  tension  cannot  be  resolved,  refinement
(or  clarification)  of  our  understanding  of  the  problem.  A  resolving
theory would show that there is no true conflict, that the ends connoted
by "liberty"  and "equality"  are perfectly reconcilable  with each other
and  fully  achievable  within  the  same  social  order;  or  else it would
resolve  such  irreconcilable  conflict  as  must  be  admitted  by  ranking
the  ends  hierarchically,  not  permitting  subordinate  ones  to  impede
21  RAwLS  7.
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full achievement of superior ones. A refining theory, on the other hand,
would  frankly  accept  a relationship  marked  by  continuing  equilibra-
tion,  shifting  readjustment,  at  most  an  endlessly  dialectical  sort  of
"progress"  towards  ultimate  settlement.  A  refining  theory  may  posi-
tively value such  a  tense  relationship  as  a source  of  social dynamism
and resilience,  but it need not.22
As a starting point of  our examination  of  Rawls' handling  of the
liberty-versus-equality  issue,  let us  examine  his principles  of justice,
arrayed in the  "lexical"  order  he  prescribes ;'
First  principle:  Maximum equal civil and political  ("ba-
sic")  rights and liberties.
22With  regard  to  the  question  of  distributive  shares,  one  sort  of  resolving  theory
would  be  an  anarchistic  one  which  simply  forbids  interference  with  maximum  mutual
liberties  of  acquisition  and  trade  for  redistributive  purposes.  A  contrasting  type  would
be  a communistic  one  which demands  as  much interference  with such liberty  as  is  neces-
sary  to  achieve  perfect  equality  of  after-tax  incomes.  Utilitarianism,  as  usually  under-
stood,  belongs  in  the  refining  category.  Utilitarianism  is,  to  be  sure,  characterized  by  a
"teleological"  structure in  which  "the  good is  defined  independently from  the  right,"  and
then  the  right is  defined  as that  which  maximizes  the  good, id. 24.  But  the  good  to  be
maximized  in  utilitarianism  is  not  usually  identified  as  either  liberty  or  equality;  both
are  treated  as  subordinate  items  to  be  optimally  mixed,  subject  to  contingencies,  in  the
overriding  interest  of  some  other,  perhaps  hedonistic,  "greatest  good."  Most  obviously
excluded  from  the  resolving  class  are  "intuitionist"  theories-those  which  hold  "that
there  is  an  irreducible  family  of  first  principles  [such  as  liberty  and  equality]  which
have  to  be  weighed against  one  another  by  asking  ourselves  which  balance,  in  our  con-
sidered  judgment,  is  the  most  just,"  and  that  "there  exist  no  higher-order  constructive
criteria  for  determining"  the  proper  balance.  Id. 34.
23 The  "lexical"  or  "serial"  ordering  "means  that  a  departure  from  the  institutions
of  equal  liberty  required  by  the  first  principle  cannot  be  justified  .. . .or  compen-
sated  for,  by  greater  social  and  economic  advantages.  The  distribution  of  wealth  and
income,  and  the  hierarchies  of  authority,, must  be  consistent  with  both  the  liberties  of
equal  citizenship  and  equality  of  opportunity."  Id.  61.  The  full,  definitive  statement  of
the  principles  is  as  follows:
First Principle
Each  person is to  have an equal right to  the most extensive total  system
of equal  basic liberties compatible with a similar system  of liberty for  all.
Second Principle
Social  and  economic  inequalities  are  to  be  arranged  so  that  they  are
both:
(a)  to  the  greatest  benefit  of  the  least  advantaged,  . . .and
(b)  attached  to  offices  and positions  open  to  all  under  conditions  of
fair  equality  of  opportunity.
First  Priority  Rule (The Priority of Liberty)
The  principles of  justice  are  to  be ranked  in lexical  order  and therefore
liberty can  be restricted  only for the sake  of liberty. There are  two cases:
(a)  a  less extensive  liberty must strengthen  the total system  of liberty
shared by  all;
(b)  a  less  than  equal  liberty  must  be  acceptable  to  those  with  the
lesser  liberty.
Second Priority  Rule  (The  Priority of  Justice  over Efficiency  and  Welfare)
The  second principle  of  justice  is  lexically  prior to  the principle  of  effi-
ciency  and to  that of maximizing  the  sum  of  advantages;  and  fair  op-
portunity  is  prior  to  the  difference  principle.  ...
(a)  an  inequality  of  opportunity  must  enhance  the  opportunities  of
those  with the  lesser  opportunity  ....
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Second  principle:
A.  Fair  equality  of  opportunity;
B.  Only such social  and economic inequali-
ties  as work for the benefit  of the worst-
off position  (the  "difference  principle").
Working  backward  from observed  social  and  economic  inequali-
ties, the total effect  can be stated this way:  such  inequalities are  per-
missible  (indeed,  desired)  if,  but  only  if  (1)  the  arrangements
generating  them work out better for  the worst-off  position  defined  by
those  arrangements  than would any more  equal structure  (the  "differ-
ence  principle");  (2)  the  various  positions  defined  by  the  arrange-
ments  are  formally  open  to  all  and  "fair  equality  of  opportunity"
(particularly  including  some  amount  of  compensatory  education)  is
provided  (the  "opportunity  principle"24);  and  (3)  in  any  event  the
civil and political "basic"  rights and liberties  of citizens are equal and
as  extensive  as  possible  consistent  with  this  condition  of  mutuality
(the  "liberty  principle").
Although  Rawls'  emphasis  on  the ordering  of  the  two principles
might suggest he is  arguing for  some  kind of  resolution  under  which
liberty  dominates  equality,  and  although,  conversely,  some  critics
seem to read him as a "resolver"  for whom equality dominates  liberty 5
(and  some  passages  in  the  book  do  suggest  such  a  reading26),  the
truth  appears  to  be  that  Rawls  offers  refinement,  not  resolution,  of
the liberty-equality tension. His difference  principle27  is, to be sure, not
intuitionist,28  for it asserts  a unitary constructive  criterion for apprais-
ing  distributive  outcomes;  and it  is  not  utilitarian,  for  that  unitary
criterion  cares  not  for  maximization  across  an  entire  social  order  of
some  universal  good.  But  the  difference  principle,  I  believe,  has  in
common  with both  intuitionist  and  utilitarian  theories  an  acceptance
of  a tense  dynamic  relationship  between  liberty  and  equality  which
24 "Opportunity  principle"  is  my  tag-line,  not  Rawls'.
25 E.g.,  Bell,  supra note  5;  Kristol,  About  Equality,  COindMNTARY,  Nov.  1972,  at
41.
26For example,  Rawls  says:  "The  naturally  advantaged  are  not  to  gain  merely
because  they  are  more  gifted,  but only  to  cover  the  costs  of  training and  education  and
for using  their  endowments  in ways  that help  the  less fortunate  as well."  RAwLs  101-02
A  similar  statement  is  found  at id.  158.  If  Rawls  means  that  the  "naturally  advan-
taged"  are  not to  receive  any  extra  income  except  what  would cover  training  costs  and
"hazard  pay," he would indeed be a  radical equalizer.  But taking the book as a whole  and
all passages in context,  it seems to  me that Rawls means to justify a much  broader notion
of  incentive  and  that he  is  prepared  to  accept  quite  substantial inequalities  as  a  result.
He is  explicit  as  to  the latter  point,  id.  158.
27 Paragraph  (a)  of  The Second Principle, note  23  supra.
2For Rawls'  definition  of  intuitionism,  see  note  22  supra.
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is  highly  sensitive  to  contingent  circumstances.29  This  interpretation,
if correct,  can certainly be  expected  to bear upon the  difference  prin-
ciple's  capacity  to generate  justiciable welfare  rights."
In  suggesting  that  the  difference  principle  accepts  a  continuing
relationship  of tension  between  liberty and  equality,  I  have  in  mind
especially  that  part  of  liberty  associated  with  rights  of  property-
with  getting,  keeping,  and  disposing  over  the  use  and  enjoyment  of
things  of  value.  This  aspect  of  liberty  is  perhaps  most  obviously  in
potential  conflict  with  equality.  A  crucial  question,  then,  is:  do  the
lexically preferred  civil  and political  ("basic")  liberties  include  those
of  acquiring,  keeping,  enjoying,  and  transmitting  property?  Perhaps
surprisingly,  Rawls  never  seems  to  answer  this  question  explicitly.3'
But perhaps it  is enough for us to see that an unqualified lexical pref-
erence  for  such  acquisitive  and  retentive  liberties  would  imply  an
anarchistic  resolution  totally  subverting  the  opportunity  and  differ-
ence principles by forbidding the taxation  needed to  carry them out-
which cannot be what  Rawls means.
32
29 When  Rawls  states that  "the  two-part  basic  structure  [i.e.,  the  bifurcated  state-
ment  of  the two  principles  and  the  First Priority Rule, note  23  supra] allows  a  recon-
ciliation  of  liberty  and  equality,"  RAwIS  204,  he  seems  to  be  addressing  himself  to  a
different,  and  less  baffling, question:  how  citizens  can be  "equal  before  the law"  (as  we
might  say)  even  as  the  law  allows  substantial  inequalities  of  position,  power,  income
and  wealth.
30 See  text  accompanying  notes  43-72  infra. It  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that
the difference principle  offers  a test and not a prescription. With  respect  to it, Rawls says:
"Often  the best  that  we  can say  of  a  law  or  policy  is that it  is  at  least not clearly  un-
just."  RAwLs  199.
31 Rawls  defines  the basic  liberties as follows:
The  basic  liberties  of  citizens  are,  roughly  speaking,  political  liberty  (the  right
to  vote and to  be eligible  for  public  office)  together  with freedom  of  speech  and
assembly;  liberty  of  conscience  and  freedom  of  thought;  freedom  of  the  person
along  with  the  right to  hold  (personal)  property;  and  freedom  from  arbitrary
arrest and seizure as  defined by the concept  of the rule  of law.
RAwLs  61.  The  qualifier  "(personal)"  is,  in  context,  evidently  meant  to  exclude  at  least
the  means  of  production  and  so  recognize  that  socialist  schemes  may  be  just.  The
"right  to  hold"  admits  easily  of  regulation  and  taxation  insofar  as  they  are  designed
"to  prevent  concentrations  of power  detrimental  to the  fair  value  [.e., effective equality]
of  political  liberty,"  id.  277,  since  the  lexically  preferred  first  principle  calls  for  "an
equal  right  to  the  most  extensive  total system  of  equal basic  liberties  compatible  with
a similar system  of liberty  for all,"  id.  302  (emphasis  added),  so  that some  basic liberties
may  be  restricted  for  the  sake  of  others,  id.  203-04.  But  taxation  to  satisfy  the  oppor-
tunity  and  difference  principles  (which  Rawls  explicitly  contemplates,  id. 277-79)  would
seemingly  violate  the  First Priority Rule, note  23  supra, unless  "(personal)  property"
(as  included  among  the  lexically  preferred  "basic  liberties")  means  only  those  posses-
sions  required  for  individual human  functioning.
32 If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  opportunity  and  difference  principles  are  to  be  saved
from such  extinction  by  reading  basic  liberties  as  not to  encompass  property  claims,  we
must  be  sure  that no  trouble  of  a  different  sort  ensues  when  we  try  to  grasp  the  true
operative  significance  of  the  proposed  lexical  ordering.  It  seems  that  in  contexts  which
come  readily  to mind, the  ordering's  force  will  be  exhausted  by ranking  both  the liberty
and  opportunity  principles  as  superior  to  the  difference  principle,  saying  that  both
liberty  and  opportunity  must  be  assured  before  any  residual  inequalities,  even  those
satisfying  the  difference  principle,  are  permitted.  It  clearly  means  something  to  say  that
the  liberty  principle  is  lexically  prior  to  the  difference  principle,  even  if property  rights
are  not a part  of liberty. For  it  might happen  that rather  extreme  social  and  economicCONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE RIGHTS
Let us now introduce  some  terms not  used  by Rawis  and incor-
porate them in a more  complete statement  of the second principle. Let
us use "occupational  liberty"  to mean freedom  in choice  of productive
activity,  and  "dispositive  liberty"  to  mean  freedom  to  dispose  over
the  proceeds  (these  two  liberties  together  comprising  a  notion  of
"proprietary"  liberty  or  "property  rights").  Then  the  "two"  princi-
ples  of  justice  might  read  as  follows  (with  all  principles  and  sub-
principles  ranked  in the  order  given):
First  principle:
A.  Liberty principle  (maximum  equal  civil,
political,  and  occupational  liberties).
Second  principle:
B.  Opportunity  principle.
C.  Difference  principle.
D.  Disposition  principle  (dispositive  liber-
ties  to be respected).
This  statement  would  make  clear  that  when  the  opportunity  or
difference  principles collide  (as they must)  with the dispositive  aspect
of  proprietary  liberty, it is  the  latter  which  must  give  way.  At  the
same  time, by revealing  proprietary  liberty  (including  the  disposition
aspect)  as itself a principle  of justice, the  statement  makes  clear  that
the opportunity and difference  principles are not unrestrained  counsels
of  levellism.
inequalities  would lead  to  greater  income  for  the worst-off  than  a  more  equal  arrange-
ment,  but  that such  an  extreme  degree  of  inequality  would undermine  effective  equality
of  political  and civil  rights;  and  in  that  case  the  lexical  priority  of  liberty  would  mean
that  the  more  equal  arrangement  is  required  even  at  some  sacrifice  in  income  for  the
worst-off.  See  note  31  supra. Likewise,  the  lexical  priority  of the  opportunity  principle
over  the  difference  principle  has  plausible  applications.  Certain  extremes  of  social  and
economic  inequalities  might  promise  more  income  for  the  worst-off  but  only  at  the
cost  (or  possibly  by  the  very  means)  of  establishing  a  hereditary  aristocracy  or  other
classbound  social  structure.  Such  inequalities  would  be  forbidden.  See  RAwLs 74,  278,
300-01.  It  is  harder  to  find  operative  significance  in  the  statement  that  the  liberty
principle  is  lexically  prior  to  the  opportunity  principle,  because  (still  assuming  that
property  claims  are  not  a  part  of  the  preferred  "liberties")  it  is  harder  to  see  how
these  can ever  come into  conflict.  What  application  can be  found  for  the proviso  in the
statement  that positions  are  to  be  formally  open  to  all under conditions  of  fair equality
of  opportunity-provided  that maximum  mutual  civil  and  political  liberty is  assured  to
all  citizens?  There  is,  at  least,  the  case  in  which  someone's  exercise  of  free  speech
rights  is  thought  to  interfere  with  fair  equality  of  opportunity-e.g.,  by  expounding
a  scientific  theory  of  racial  inferiority.  Here  the  lexical  ordering  would  apparently
forbid  any  curbs  on  speech.  Another  case  which  comes  to  mind  is  a  proposal  to  bring
about  equality  of  opportunity by  holding back  the  naturally  gifted.  Such a  tactic  would
plainly  be  disapproved  by  Rawls,  but  the disapproval  is  to  be  found in the  definition  of
the  concept  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity,  not  in  the  priority  rules.  See  text  accom-
panying  note  73  infra. Stili,  this  case  suggests  a  possible  exegetical  canon  which  we
should  keep  in  mind:  that the  priority  rules,  and  the  idea  of  lexical  orderings,  are  not
to  be  understood  in  a  crudely  fundamentalist  or  vindictively  literal  way,  but  rather
to be  taken  more  loosely as  a way  of lending  shape  and  structure to the  entire doctrine,
which  is  to  remain  supple  and not hidebound.
19731974  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  121:962
Suppose  we  have  arrived  at a set  of  arrangements  affording  fair
equality  of  opportunity  and satisfying  the  difference  principle  in  the
minimal  sense  that no  reduction  in inequality  will improve  the lot  of
the disadvantaged.  In this  region the fine tuning  seems  most naturally
to take the form of taxation of the best-  (or better-)  off representative
person  ("the  top")  in  order  to  transfer  the  proceeds  to  the  worst-
(or worse-)  off representative  person  ("the  bottom").  To say that the
difference  principle  is  minimally  satisfied  means  that  the  top  has  al-
ready been pared down,  and the bottom  already  lifted,  by such  taxes
and transfers  to  the  point  where  the  disincentive  effect  of  a  further
increment  of  taxation  will  reduce  GNP  by just  enough  to  offset  the
bottom's increased  relative  share,  so  that the  bottom's absolute  situa-
tion will remain  unchanged.  Now suppose  that there  is some  appreci-
able  range  over  which  addititional  taxation  could  further  pare  down
the top without lowering the bottom  or  raising it, but making  the  dis-
tribution  more  equalY 3  The suggested  insertion of  a "disposition  prin-
ciple"  into the hierarchy of principles  of justice means that in this case
Rawls would prefer  the less equal distribution-that is, the one which,
ceteris paribus, maximizes  dispositive  liberty.  Various  considerations
can be marshalled to  show that this  is indeed what  Rawls means.
With  regard  to  distribution  of  shares,  respect  for  dispositive
liberty  is  equivalent  to  adherence  to  the  criterion  of  efficiency  or
Pareto-optimality 3 4  Both  would  protect  the  top  from  transfers  de-
signed  to  reduce  inequality,  without  raising  the  bottom's  absolute
level.  Rawls  is  explicit  that  efficiency  is  a proper  criterion  of  choice
between distributions which are in all other relevant respects similar; 3
33 The  discussion  at this point  ignores  the  possible interactions  between  the bottom's
relative situation  and  its  absolute situation:  that  is,  it  disregards  the  possibility  that
further  paring  down  of  the  top  will  bring net  improvement  to  the  bottom's  situation,
even  while  it fails  to  raise  the  bottom's  real  money  income,  because  it alleviates  "rela-
tive  deprivation"  effects.  It  seems  justifiable  to  consider  cases  in  which  no  such  phe-
nomenon  occurs,  wholly  apart  from  any  possible  doubts  about  the  reality  of  relative
deprivation.  These  cases  may  arise  either  because  within  the  range  of  additional  trans-
fers  we  have  in  mind-those  which  will  not lower  the  bottom's  real  money  income-no
noticeable  alleviation  of  relative  deprivation  will  occur  (i.e.,  there  are  discontinuities  in
the  function  relating  the  intensity  of  tax-transfer  activity  to  the  magnitude  of  relative-
deprivation  effects);  or  because,  assuming  no  such  discontinuities,  there  is  a  range  of
tax-transfer  increments  within  which  reduction  of  the  bottom's  real  money  income
will  be just offset  by  reduction  of  relative  deprivation.  The problem  of'relative  depriva-
tion  is  further  considered  at  note  57  infra & accompanying  text,  and  at  text  accom-
panying  notes  68-70  infra.
34 [A]  configuration  is  efficient  whenever  it is  impossible  to  change  it so  as  to
make  some  persons  (at  least  one)  better  off  without  at  the  same  time  making
other  persons  (at  least  one)  worse  off.  Thus  a  distribution  . . . among  certain
individuals  is  efficient  if  there  exists  no  redistribution  ...  that  improves  the
circumstances  of  at  least  one  of  these  individuals  without  another  being  dis-
advantaged.
RAwLs  67.
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and Rawls'  argument and statement of the principles, taken altogether,
indicate rather  strongly that increments of inequality do not, in and of
themselves,  constitute  relevant  counter-arguments.3 6
This  reading  is  indirectly  bolstered  by  its  consistency  with  a
number  of  factors  in  the total  argument, including:  (1)  the intuitive
argument for choosing the difference  principle in the  original position,
which  relies  on probabilistic  appraisal  of  alternatives,  conditioned  by
special  sensitivity to downside risk;3 7  (2)  the emphasis  given the con-
tention that envy should  be  disregarded in constructing  this  choice;"
(3)  the strong intimations that there is positive moral value in allowing
distribution  to  be  as much  as  possible  a matter  of  "pure  procedural
justice, 3 9  together with  (4)  the  clearly  expressed  preference  for  oc-
cupational  liberty;4"  and  (5)  the  textual  irresolution,  noted  above,
concerning  the  inclusion  of  property  rights  in the  lexically  preferred
basic liberties.41
In sum, the Rawlsian  ethic  calls for inequalities to be reduced  to
a  point, but  also  to be  allowed  (even  favored)  to  a point.  The  sub-
principles  of  the  second  principle  of  justice,  taken  all  together,  can
only be called a set of precepts  for  adjusting tension between  equality
and  proprietary  liberty-tension  which is  not about to disappear.  At
this particular value-frontier,  there is no effective lexical ordering. The
precepts  of  the  second  principle,  while  they  may well  strike  us  as  a
compelling way of accommodating  proprietary liberty with an adequate
notion of  human moral  equality,  do  all  the same  compose  a  mode  of
accommodation, not of resolution.42  We should  not be surprised,  then,
3 6 See  note  23  supra. Note  especially  paragraph  (a)  of  the  Second Principle and
the first  clause  of the  Second Priority Rule.
The  following  statement  of  the  difference  principle  suggests  that  Rawls  would
favor additional taxation  which would lower  the top without  raising  the bottom:  "[T]he
higher  expectations  of those better  situated  are just if and only if they  work  as part of a
scheme  which  improves  the  expectations  of  the  least  advantaged  members  of  society."
RAwILs  75  (emphasis  added).  But that  statement should  be  compared  with  the  follow-
ing  definition  of  Rawls'  principle  of  efficiency,  which suggests  that  Rawls  would  oppose
such  transfers:
[Ain arrangement  of  rights  and  duties  .. .is  efficient  if  and only if it is  im-
possible  .. .to redefine the scheme  of rights and duties, so  as to raise the  expec-
tations  of  any  representative  man  ...  without  at  the  same  time  lowering  the
expectations  of  some  .. .other  representative  man.
Id. 70  (emphasis  added).
37 Compare id. 152-54 with id.  164-66.
s8AId.  143-44,  538.
39  d.  83-88,  274-75.
401d. 272-73,  276.
41 Text accompanying note 31 supra.
42 The Second Principle expresses a  rather  sophisticated  notion of  the  moral  equality
of  mankind. See RAws  504-12.  Accidents  of  birth and natural  endowment  being, in  this
view,  morally  irrelevant,  social  institutions  are  to  be  designed  so  as  to  allow  nature's
endowments  of  ability  to  work  for the  good  of  all,  not  just  for  the  good  of the  gifted.
Id.  100-04;  see also id.  74-75.  One  might  be  tempted  to  say  that  the  opportunity  and
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if these precepts  are  indeterminate  and  debatable  in  their  contingent
applications.
3.  Welfare  Implications  of  Justice  as  Fairness
We  turn  now  to  a  more  specific  search  for  the  welfare-rights
implications  of  the principles  of justice.  It  will be  convenient  to  con-
sider  separately the difference  principle,  the opportunity  principle,  and
the liberty principle in that order. Eventually we shall have to consider
the meaning and  bearing of  the theory as a whole.
a.  The Difference Principle
Within the general framework  of a free-market  system, the differ-
ence principle  is said to  imply a claim on behalf  of  each person  to  a
Csocial minimum"  which  must  be provided  in  order that  the residual
market  determination  of  distributive  shares  may  be  considered  just.
Although this claim could perhaps be  satisfied, partly if not wholly, by
legislative  creation  of  insurance  rights  concerning  minimum  levels  of
service  to  such needs  as  subsistence,  health,  and the  like, it seems  at
least equally  satisfiable by general monetary  transfer  schemes  such as
negative income taxes. 3 Even if the latter method is preferred, it seems
worth  considering  whether  the  dollar  value  of  the  minimum  (most
likely expressed  as a rate of income)  might be shown to depend  on, or
reflect,  which particular  needs  are  to  be  covered  and  at what  levels.
If  so,  it may  be  possible  to  construct  constitutional  insurance  rights
out of  the "social  minimum"  conception.  If not, the  difference  princi-
ple's  welfare-rights  implications  will  be  exhausted  by  a  minimum-
income  claim which,  I have suggested,'  will tend to be less justiciable
than a set of insurance rights.
Our  study  of  the  difference  principle's  insurance-rights  implica-
tions will proceed in the following way. We shall first pursue the matter
on  the  assumption  that the  bottom's  prospects  (which  the  difference
principle  requires  to be  maximized)  are  to  be defined  in terms  only
difference  principles,  serially  coupled,  are  indeed  a  kind  of  definition  of  what  Rawls
means  by  the  statement  that  persons  are  "equal."  These  coupled  principles  might  be
seen  as  the  operationalized  expression  of  his  moral  notion  of  equality  as  applicable  to
social  institutions.  This  interpretation  gains  support  from  Rawis'  willingness  to  enter-
tain  the  idea  that a  suitably  restricted  version  of  the  difference  principle  might  justify
inequalities  in  the  political  structure.  See  text  accompanying  notes  110-17  infra. Yet  he
flatly  rejects  the  application  of  the  difference  and  opportunity  principles  to  the  distri-
bution  of  the  most  basic  liberties  of  all,  those  of  conscience.  As  to  these,  he  calls  for
absolute  mutuality  and  will  not be  content  with  institutions  which  would  claim  to have
confirmed  moral  equality  in  principle  by  in  practice  maintaining  unequal  liberties  sup-
posed to maximize  the liberties  of  the less  free.  RAwLS  206-09.
43 See  RAwLs  275.  Rawls'  notion  of  "primary  goods"  and  his  related  strictures  re-
garding  paternalism  suggest  reasons  why  monetary  transfers  might  be  preferred.  See
note  11 supra; note  142  infra.
44 Text accompanying notes  17-18 supra.CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
of the primary social goods  of income and wealth  (rights  and liberties
evidently being taken care of by the liberty principle).  On this assump-
tion  we  shall  compare  the  difference  principle  with  that  of  average
utility  (which  Rawls  plainly  regards  as  the  difference  principle's
most plausible competitor45)  to see which is more  receptive to a notion
of  welfare  insurance  rights.  We  shall  then  ask  whether,  under  the
difference  principle,  the  bottom's  expectations  are  to  be  maximized
also with regard to the primary social good  of self-respect  or  "a sense
of  one's  own  worth"  (the  most  important  primary  good  of  all,  as
Rawls ultimately says);  and if so, what  difference  this  makes.
If we were working up a taxonomy of distributive-share  precepts,
one  of the classifying traits we  might well use would  be the represen-
tative  standpoint  from  which  the  distribution  is  regarded.  For  the
difference  principle,  this  is  the  worst-off  representative  person,  what
we  have been  calling the  bottom.  For the  principle  of average  utility
it would be the middle, or, assuming  constant population,  the whole.46
Another,  and  intersecting,  distinction  for  distributive-share  precepts
might be that between precepts which are maximizing  and those which
are "satisficing" :47 Does the precept take the view that "more is better,"
or rather that "enough  is enough"?  This may seem a potentially fruit-
ful distinction  for our inquiry insofar  as a highly articulated  (that is,
justiciable)  conception  of insurance rights may seem to fit more natur-
ally  under  a  satisficing  than  a maximizing  precept.  Now  a precept
such  as average utility, which views  things from the standpoint  of the
middle  or the whole must in strict logic be a maximizing  one,  while  a
precept  which views  things  from  the  standpoint  of  the  bottom  may
seem more likely to be satisficing. 48  It might, therefore, seem as though
the  difference  principle  would  be more  likely than  average  utility  to
point the way to an insurance-rights  package. But of course the differ-
ence  principle  is  itself maximizing,  not  satisficing;  speaking  for  the
bottom, it says that more  is better 9 And  the curious  truth  turns  out
45 See RAWLS  161-66.
46 Rawls'  definition  of average utility is  more refined but leads to the same thing:
To  apply this  conception  to  the  basic  structure,  institutions  are set  up so  as to
maximize  the  percentage  weighted  sum  of  the  expectations  of  representative
individuals.  To  compute  this  sum  we  multiply  expectations  by  the  fraction  of
society at the corresponding  position.
Id. 162.
47See H. SIMoN,  MODELS  OF MAN:  SocAL  AND  RATIONAL  261,  270-71  (1957).
48 If  the precept  is concerned  only with satisfaction  of minimum standards  or  require-
ments,  and  indifferent  to  variations  above  the  minimum,  it  has  adopted  the  bottom's
standpoint.  (If it  is  the precept  of  absolute  equality,  under  which  the  minimum  is  also
the  maximum,  the  distinction  between  the  two  standpoints  simply  becomes  irrelevant.)
49 This  is  clearly  correct  for  the  difference  principle  in  isolation.  That  it  is  not,
however,  a  correct  statement  when  applied  to  justice  as  fairness,  as  a  whole  set  of
principles  regarded  from  the  original  position,  will  become  important  later  on.  See  text
accompanying  notes  77-80 infra.
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to be that average utility is  the more amenable  of the two precepts  to
constructing  an  argument  for  social  insurance  focused  on particular
needs, because  it is not tied to a short list of general social goods  such
as income  and wealth and,  accordingly,  allows for much  more latitude
and specificity in making  assumptions  about what  people  really  want
and need. And yet, as we  shall see,  the very considerations  underlying
this  conclusion  also  show  that  the  average-utility  argument  for  in-
surance-rights  is not an  argument for  "rights"  at all in the sense  that
concerns  us, but merely  an  argument  for  social expediency;  and  it is
precisely for the reason that average utility is concerned with expediency
rather than  rights  that  Rawls  rejects  it as a guiding  principle.
The  difference  principle  asks  whether  the tax-transfer  structure,
with its associated  incentive structure,  can be altered  so as to improve
the situation of the bottom.5 0 The average-utility principle asks whether
any  possible  alteration  can  increase  total  consumer  satisfaction  (as-
suming  no  change  in  population).r"  For  average  utility,  at  least,  a
notion  of  "basic needs"  might be  relevant insofar  as we  make  certain
assumptions about the relationships  between the intensity of a person's
desire  for  additional  quanta  of  certain  goods  and  the  "amounts"  of
those  goods he  already has. These  assumptions,  indeed,  are but varia-
tions  and refinements  of  the asumption  of  "declining  marginal utility
of  income"  which  utilitarians  commonly  make  in  arguing  for  some
degree  of  income-equalizing  tax-transfer  activity.5  They  posit  that
persons now enjoying  little or  none of  certain  goods  would  be  willing
to pay, for certain increments to their existing low levels of enjoyment,
amounts  exceeding production  costs  by more  than the  normal market
rate of  profit.
5 3  Borrowing  from  economic  jargon,  we  might  call  this
5oSee  text  accompanying  note  33  supra. Treating  tax-transfer  arrangements  as  the
only component to be manipulated may be an oversimplification,  since even if these arrange-
ments  are optimal  for the bottom,  given  the rest of  the basic structure  as it stands, some
possible  alteration  of  other  sectors  of the  basic structure,  or some  general revision  of the
structure  itself  might  improve  the  bottom's  situation.  I  am simply  assuming,  subject to
further  investigation,  that  if  even  the  oversimplified  inquiry  made  here  fails  to  yield
justiciable welfare  rights, they  would  not be  derivable  by a  more  complex inquiry,  entail-
ing still  further  debatable  choices.
51 See  note 46  supra.
52For  an  elaboration  and  criticism  of  the  notion  of  declining  marginal  utility  of
income,  see W. BLum  & H. KALvEN,  Tna  UNEAsy  CASE  FOR  PRoGREssiE  TAxAT  N  56-63
(1953).
53 Let  a,  b,  c  and  d  stand  for  progressively  higher  levels  of  enjoyment  of  some
good. If  a  is a  very low  level,  b  is barely  adequate,  and  c  rather  high,  the  value  of  b
minus a may greatly exceed  that of  d minus  c, even though  there  are plausible  scales  (e.g.,
production  costs  or physical  quantities)  under  which  the  two  differences  are  the  same.
Indeed,  there may be  no increment  to a which has the same  value  as any  increment to  c.
Increments  to  a  which  are  smaller  than  b  minus  a may  all  be  virtually  worthless,  and
increments  to a at least equal  to  b minus a, of great  value; whereas  increments  to  a seem
always  to  have  some  marginal  value  but  never  as much  as  b  minus a.  Consider  all  this
in  the  case  of  food  (allowing  increments  to  reflect  improvements  not  only  of  quantity
but  of mix,  variety, quality,  refinement  of  preparation,  rarity,  delicacy,  etc.).CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE  RIGHTS
excess a (Cconsumeris surplus"  arising under nondiscriminatory  pricing
when dollars are  spent to satisfy urgent  needs  arising out of  depriva-
tions, absolute or relative, not widely experienced  in the economy.5
Income  transfers  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  which  enable  the
bottom to cover the costs of such high-surplus  increments  would,  even
allowing  for  disincentive  effects  which  reduce  total  material  output,
seem likely to raise the total of consumer  satisfaction;  and if  so, such
transfers  would  be  required  by  average  utility.5  One  can  imagine
trying  to  specify  for  any  given  economy  a critical  list  of  minimum
service  levels  regarding  certain  needs,  such  that  the  anti-productive
effects  of intensified tax-transfer activity required to enable the bottom
to  cover the costs  of this  basic set would be just offset  by the welfare
gained  through  shifting  resources  to the  satisfaction  of  these hitherto
unmet  basic  needs.  This  would  be  the  point  where  total  consumer
satisfaction is at its maximum and average utility is  content. Through
this line  of thought it is at least conceivable  that under average-utility
reasoning  a  social  minimum  could  be  exhaustively  defined  or  calcu-
lated  by reference  to the  costs  of  satisfying  a basic set  of  minimum
levels of  service  to particular  needs.56
Of  course  this  will  seem  an  outrageously  impractical  recipe  for
calculating  a  complete  social  minimum,  especially  considering  that
54  See A.  TAsr.L , PRINCIPLEs  op  EcoxomAIcs  124  (1890)  ; Hicks, The Rehabilitation
of  Consumers'  Surplus, 9  REv.  EcoN.  STu-IEs  108  (1941),  reprinted in  READINGs  IN
NVELrAA  EcoNoicS  325  (K. Arrow & T. Scitovsky  eds.  1969).
55 This  ignores  the  claims  of future  generations  and the  associated  notion  of  a "just
savings  principle,"  discussed  at  RAwLs 284-93.  Like  the  oversimplification  discussed  in
note  50  supra, this  oversimplification  seems  allowable  in  view  of  our  inquiry's  limited
purpose.
GSAmong  the  qualifications  and  refinements  required  for  full  development  of  the
foregoing argument,  the  following  may be  briefly  noted:
First,  to  be  precise  we  ought  to speak  of  basic  packages  of  inferrelated  needs  and
service  levels, rather  than collections  of mutually  independent  basic needs  and  levels. The
statement  that I  would  give everything  I had in return for treatment  of  my tuberculosis
breaks  down  if all I  have  is just enough  to eat. A more  precise statement  might be  that
I  would  give  all  I  had  to  be  both  cured  and  fed.  Again,  how  much  shelter  (in  the
form  of artificial heat)  I deem  essential may  depend  on what diet  and clothing are  avail-
able  to  me;  and  how  much  education  I  deem  essential  might  depend  on what  level  of
subsistence  is  assured me  in any  event. Thus there seem  to be  various sets  of value-inter-
changeable  basic packages.  Cf. Tribe, supra  note 6, at 91-92.  It would seem that in looking
for  that  package  whose  provision  will  satisfy  average  utility  we  should  focus  on  that
package in  each such  set which  is  cheapest to produce.
Second,  the  discussion  applies  only  to  needs  which  in  normal  course  would  be
satisfied  by  the  expenditure  of  money.  It has  no  obvious  application  to  "goods"  which
normally  one  already  has when born, such  as  limbs and organs;  or to  "goods"  which  are
not materially  costly to produce,  such  as bodily  freedom  and privacy. A  discussion  which
may  be plausible  in  regard  to  the  former  sort  of  goods  may  well  seem  bizarre  when
applied  to the  others.
Third, I  believe  that  the  notion  of  basic  needs  developed  here  is  at  least  remotely
akin  to  notions  of  rights being  cultivated  by professors  Tribe,  supra note  6, and  Charles
Fried  (in an unpublished  paper).  The notions  have  in common  the supposition  of  "lump-
iness"  and "groupiness"  in the exchange  schedules  ("indifference  curves")  which show how
an individual  would trade  off  (or  decline  to trade  off)  various  increments  of  some  goods
against  various  increments  of others.
19731980  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  121:962
the  contents  of  the  basic  set  of  needs  must  undergo  continuing  re-
definition  to  keep  abreast  of  changes  in  total  output,  distribution,
social practice, and "tastes.'57 And even disregarding its impracticality,
what has been  described  is only a method  for  calculating a minimum,
not  a  method  for  delivering it.  While  the  calculation  is  hinged  to
specific  needs,  delivery  might  well  be  in  unrestricted  cash.  The  cal-
culation  proceeds  from  general  assumptions  about  most  people's per-
ceptions  of  their  basic  economic  priorities;  but  even  if  one  thought
that  such  general  assumptions  might  be  accurate  enough  to  provide
the  best  available  approach  to  calculating  the  universal  social  mini-
mum  guaranty that  would  maximize  total  consumer  satisfaction,  one
might still  choose  to make  some  or  all  distributions  in  cash  so  as  to
avoid unnecessary sacrifices  of welfare in the cases of recipients whose
actual priorities  vary from  those  of  the general  model.
Given  the difficulties of calculation,  the elusive  and presumptuous
nature  of the necessary  suppositions, and  the possible  wastefulness  of
in-kind  distribution,  it  seems  unlikely  that  utilitarians  would  try to
compose  their  entire social  minimum  by  packaging  various  constitu-
tional  insurance  rights.  Yet some  select  members  of  the  basic  set  of
needs  might  seem  so  obviously  universal  and  durable  as  to  warrant
recognition  as insurance  rights,  were it not for  the fundamental  prob-
lem  of  principle  already  mentioned:  under  average-utility  notions,
transfers  (no  matter  how  calculated)  are undertaken  for  the  sake  of
a  maximizing  interest  ascribed  to  the  populace  as  a whole,  and  not
for  the  sake  of  any  acknowledged  claim  of  justice  or  right  on  the
part of the disadvantaged  claimant  as  such.  This being  so, it is  quite
unclear  why  any  policy  favoring  such  transfers  should  be  advanced
in the guise  of "rights"-meaning  demands  that are to be met  despite
an  opposing  legislative  will-especially  when  it  is  supposed,  as  in
"ideal  theory,"  that the legislature is the authentic  voice  of a morally
enlightened  population.58
57The  idea  that  "minimum"  levels  of  service  to  particular  needs,  below  which  a
special  sense  of deprivation  will  arise, might  depend on  levels which  prevail  generally  in
the society  need not rest on  any un-Rawsian  notions about envy.  (For Rawls'  treatment
of  envy,  see  RAwLs  143-44,  538.)  Some  needs--education  is  an  obvious  example-may
have  intrinsically  competitive  aspects.  But  beyond that, needs  are subject  to  influence  by
acculturative  factors  quite  discrete  from  envy.  See  McBride,  supra note  15,  at  998-99.
These  factors  do  not exert  their  influence  only  though  psychic  channels.  A  commonplace
illustration  concerns  one's  "need"  for an automobile.  Where  private  automobile  ownership
is  prevalent,  it  may  be  expected  that  (1)  general  land-use  patterns  will  reflect  such
prevalent  ownership  in  a  way  that  tends  to  increase  distances  between  most  residential
areas  and  most  work  places,  and  (2)  political  pressure  for  social  investment  in  public
transportation  will  be  depleted.  Thus  a  private  car  may  become,  in  practice,  a  critical
factor  in  employability  and in  general  mobility.
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More than anything  else,  what  appears  to  distinguish  the  differ-
ence  principle  from  that  of  average  utility  is  that  the  former  does
establish  distributive  claims  for  the  disadvantaged  to  press  on  their
own behalf, and not simply as happenstance  advocates  for the  general
public  interest.  And  so  one  turns  to  the  possibility  of  extending  the
"basic set"  method  of  defining  and  calculating  a social  minimum,  or
part  of it, to  the  minimum  implied  by  the  difference  principle.  But
this,  it turns  out,  cannot  be  done.  One  can say  that the  difference-
principle  social  minimum  must  be  at  least  as  large  as  the  average-
utility  social  minimum,  because  all  changes  designed  to  achieve  the
latter minimum must increase the bottom's income and all such changes
are  required by the  difference  principle. 9  But  this is  not at  all  the
same thing  as saying that the difference-principle  minimum  could  ever
be calculated, even in part, by asking what particular needs the bottom
was able  to satisfy at various  income  levels. The  special  relevance  of
basic needs for average  utility is that the abnormally high consumer's
surplus  they  imply  can  overbalance  the  antiproductive  effects  of
tax-induced  disincentives  so  as  to yield  a  net increase  in  total  con-
sumer  satisfaction.  But  increases  in  consumer  satisfaction,  as  such,
hold  no  interest  for  the  difference  principle.  That  principle  simply
pursues  any  increase  in  the  bottom's  income,  whether  or  not  large
enough to yield  a net  rise in consumer  satisfaction  in  the  face  of tax
increases  and  associated  incentive  and  production  losses.  Income-
transfer activity  is simply to be intensified just up to  the point where
any further  intensification  lowers  total  output  so  much  that  the  bot-
tom's absolute  income  begins to fall  even  as its relative  share of  total
consumer satisfaction  continues  to rise. Under the  difference  principle,
that  is  all  there  is  to  it.  There  can  be  no  implicit  insurance-rights
package because  there is no concern  for what the bottom spends  (or is
able  to spend)  its  income  on.  Income  is  income-a  primary,  an  ele-
mental,  social good, of which the bottom simply wants  and is  entitled
to as much as it can  get.
So we  have  arrived  at this point:  Under  average  utility there  is
a  difficult  argument  for  relating  a  social  minimum  to  basic  needs
(or  articulating  a  minimum  in  terms  of  social  insurance  for  basic
needs),  but no  argument  for  erecting  the minimum  so  conceived  into
a  constitutional  right;  whereas  under  the  difference  principle  a right
is  surely  implied,  but  it is  a  (less  justiciable)  income  right  rather
than a (more justiciable)  set of insurance rights.
59 This  reflects  the  "maximin"  rationale  for  preferring  the  difference  principle  over
average utility in the  original position.  RAwLs 152-56.
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Even  apart  from  the  quest  for  justiciability,  the  position  under
the difference principle is unsatisfactory. A precept for the distribution
of  material  social  goods  which  ignores  claims  regarding  basic  needs
as such, and  is  sensitive only to  claims  regarding money income,  will
for many  of us seem  incomplete  and  thus not  fully in  harmony with
our  "considered  judgments."6  And  there  are surface  indications  that
this is true for Rawls himself,  for his own references  to the size  of the
social  minimum  equivocate  between  emphasis  on needs  and  emphasis
on  holding  down  inequality.6  (One  comes  away  with  the  impression
that the minimum is to be set with a view both to assuring  fulfillment
of  certain  relatively  basic  needs  and  to  accomplishing  a desired,  but
highly  contingent  and  ineffable,  degree  of  income  equalization.)  We
are  obliged,  then,  to  consider  whether  we  have  pressed  the  inquiry
far enough.
60It  may  be  asked  how  anyone's  considered  judgments  can  be  offended  by  a
principle  that  demands  the  maximum  possible  income  for  the  bottom,  merely  because
that  principle  exhibits  no  concern  for  satisfying  any  particular  needs  the  bottom  may
be supposed to  have.  If certain  needs  remain unsatisfied  even  after the difference  principle
is  satisfied, nothing more can be done to meet  them. How, then,  can considered judgments
be  offended?
The  answer  is  that  a  considered  judgment  is  composed  not  only  of  a  conclusion
regarding  the  rightness  of a  given  act  or outcome,  but also  of a reason  or reasons,  how-
ever indistinct  or  inarticulate,  for that conclusion.  I  further suggest that  the  reasons may
have  practical  importance  not  only  in  indicating  what  is  to  be  done  in  the  particular
case  (if the  conclusion  is  that  correction  is  required),  but  also  in  conditioning  our more
general  response  to  situations  of  that  type.
Suppose  a  number  of  persons  are  seen  to  have  incomes  so  low  that  they  cannot
obtain  basic  health  care.  Two  observers  might  agree  that the  situation  demands  correc-
tion,  but  disagree  about  the  reasons.  The  first  may  say  that  the  observed  inability  of
some  persons  to  obtain  health  care  out  of  private  income  is  strong  evidence  that  the
difference  principle  is  being  violated.  It is  hard to  know  what remedial  action  he  could
demand  except  that  the  legislature,  with  such  economic-policy  advice  as  it  can  garner,
immediately  consider  whether  the  bottom's  income  might not  be  raised  by  some  means
consistent  with the  liberty  and  opportunity  principles.  The  necessary  analysis  is  likely  to
prove  time-consuming  and  complex.  A  decision  to  stand  pat,  on  the  ground  that  no
increase  in  the  bottom's  income  is  in  fact  possible,  will  almost certainly  not  be  demon-
strably  wrong.  The  first  observer  could strongly  believe  that it  is  wrong,  without  ques-
tioning  the  legislature's  good  faith.  At  this  point,  the  first  observer  could  make  no
further demands.
The second  observer  says that  the existing  situation is  troubling not  only  because  it
suggests that  the  bottom's income  is  not as high  as  it could  be,  but also  because  persons
are  entitled  not  to  be  barred  from  basic  health  care  by  impecunity-recognizing  as  a
natural  limitation  that  the  right  is  exhausted  once it  can  b  shown  that  the  bottom's
income  is  as high  as it can  possibly  be,  or  that  there  is  no  way  to  free  the  health-care
interest  from  the  impecunity  risk  without  displacing  that  risk  onto  some  other  interest
deemed at least  equally  important. The  second  observer,  then, can  demand  that the legis-
lature  enact  a health-insurance  program,  and  the  burden  of  persuasion  will  then  be  on
those  who  disagree  to  show  that  the  natural  limitation  supports  their  position.
Thus the difference  in  reasons  given  for  the same  conclusion  may  have  an  important
effect  on attitudes  with which  the problem  of  correction  is  approached,  and  therefore  on
the  legislative  outcome;  and  this  possibility  exists  although  ve  assume,  consistent  with
the suppositions  of ideal  theory, that  the legislature  always  acts  in good  faith.
61The "needs"  factor  is  emphasized  at  RAwLS  276-77.  The  "equalization"  factor  is
apparent at id. 285-86. It should  be recalled  that some  amount  of  equalizing  taxation  will
be undertaken  for the sake  of protecting fair equality  of political liberty  and of  opportu-
nity. Id. 277-79;  note  32  supra. But  this  does  not  exclude  further  equalization  for  the
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An obvious  place  to  look  further  is into  the  notion  of  primary
social  goods.  This  notion's  lack of  articulation  seemed  in  our  discus-
sion to  play  an important  role  in  masking insurance  rights  out of  a
difference-principle  social minimum. That discussion,  of course, focused
on the objective, material primary social goods  of income  and wealth.
Perhaps  we  can  get where we-and  evidently  Rawls,  as  well-would
like to go  by including the primary good  of  self-respect  among  those
with  respect  to  which  the  bottom's  prospects  are  to  be  maximized.
Rawls  defines  self-respect  as  follows:
We may define  self-respect  ...  as having two  aspects.  First
of all,...  it  includes  a person's  sense  of his  own value,  his
secure  conviction  that his conception  of his good, his plan  of
life,  is  worth  carrying  out. And  second,  self-respect  implies
a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power,
to  fulfill  one's  intentions.  When  we  feel  that our  plans  are
of little value, we  cannot pursue  them with  pleasure  or  take
delight in their  execution.  Nor  plagued  by failure  and  self-
doubt can we continue in our endeavors.  It  is clear then why
self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may  seem
worth  doing,  or  if  some  things  have  value  for  us,  we  lack
the  will  to strive  for them.  All  desire  and  activity  becomes
empty  and  vain,  and  we  sink  into  apathy  and  cynicism.
Therefore  the parties in  the  original position  would wish to
avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine
self-respect.2
I  shall  assume  without  detailed  discussion  that  the  notion  of
self-respect  as  a  moral  entitlement  is  perfectly  capable  of  implying
some  conception  of  a  minimum  insurance-rights  package.  Rawls  cap-
tures  the  essence  of  this  view  when  he  refers  to  a  "psychological
condition"  in  which  "persons  lack  a  sure  confidence  in  their  own
value  and in  their ability to  do anything worthwhile,"  and  notes  that
many  occasions  arise  when  this  psychological  condition  is
experienced  as  painful  and  humiliating.  The  discrepancy
between  oneself  and  others  is  made  visible  by  the  social
structure  and style of life of one's society. The less  fortunate
are therefore  often forcibly reminded of their situation, some-
times leading  them to an  even lower  estimate  of  themselves
and  their mode  of living.3
But there is initial difficulty in feeding this view into applications
of the difference  principle,  because by itself it does not seem to  fit the
difference  principle's  "more  is  better"  attitude.  The  self-respect  ap-
02 RAWLS  440.
03  Id.  535.
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proach  to  welfare  rights  most  naturally  seems  to  want  to  satisfy  a
minimum,  not  to get  more  and  more.  Such  a  difference  between  in-
come  and  wealth,  on  the  one  hand,  and  self-respect,  on  the  other,
may  be illustrated  by  the  following  graphs,  in  which  the  horizontal
axes  both  measure  intensity  of  tax-transfer  activity  ("T")  and  the
vertical  axes  measure,  respectively,  the bottom's  expectations  regard-
ing  income  ("E,")  and  the  bottom's  expectations  regarding  self-
respect  ("E.").  The  relationship  between  T  and  E,  is  depicted  by a
roof-shaped  curve  indicating that at lower levels  of T any  disincentive
effects  are  more  than  offset  by  the  increase  in  the  bottom's  share,
while the  converse  is  true at the higher  levels  of  T.64  The top  of the






coherently requires that T be  set at level T,. The relationship  between
T and E  can  only  be  shown as  a horizontal  line  beginning  where  T
is at level T;.65 This  is the minimum T which  can satisfy the income/
Self-Respect  -E.
Expectation  /




Tax-Transfer Activity  (T)
64 See  text  accompanying  note 33  supra.
65 The descending tail to the left of T. is meant  to allow for the plausible  qualification
that there  is a rather  narrow, "closing-in"  range  of provision  for the bottom's basic  needsCONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
welfare  requirements  of  self-respect,  and  any  additional  T, while  it
might  increase E.  (if T,  is  less then  T,)  can have  no effect  on E..
Rawls  states  that  "in  applying  the  difference  principle  we  wish
to  include in the  prospects  of the  least  advantaged  the primary  good
of  self-respect;  and  there are  a variety of  ways of  taking account  of
this  value  consistent  with  the  difference  principle."" 0  But  in  fact  he
intimates  only one  way in  which self-respect  might  be accounted  for
through application of  the  difference  principle  (though,  as  we  shall
see,  there  are  clearly  many  ways  of  doing  so  witkout  contradicting
the difference  principle).  Raws says:
To some  extent  men's  sense  of  their  own  worth may  hinge
upon their  institutional position and  their income  share....
[But]  with the appropriate  background  arrangements,  [the]
inclinations  [to  social  envy  and  jealousy]  should  not  be
excessive,  at  least  not when  the priority  of  liberty  is  effec-
tively upheld.  But  theoretically  we  can if  necessary  include
self-respect  in the primary goods, the  index of which  defines
expectations. Then  in applications  of the difference  principle,
this  index  can  allow  for  the  effects  of  excusable  envy  [i.e.,
injuries  to  self-respect];  the  expectations  of  the  less  advan-
taged  are lower the more  severe  these effects.  Whether  some
adjustment  for  self-respect  has  to  be made  is  best  decided
from the standpoint of the legislative  stage where the parties
have  more  information  about  social  circumstances  and  the
principle  of political determination  appliesY
7
Rawls  is,  however,  far  from  persuaded  that  any  adjustment  in  the
difference  principle's  application  will  ever be  required  in  the  interest
of self-respect."8  And he does not give us any direct statement  of what
form  such an  adjustment could take.  Self-respect  aside,  the difference
principle has  already, presumably,  led to the setting  of T at level  T,.
within which  the effect  is  to  lift the bottom's  self-respect  some  distance,  but not  as high
as  it  might be  lifted  by  income  transfers.  This  possibility  of  a  basic-needs-related  self-
respect  continuum  seems  to  be  recognized  at  RAwts  546.  Elsewhere,  however,  Rawis
seems to  differentiate  self-respect,  viewed  as  a satisficing  kind  of good, from  income  and
wealth, viewed  as  a maximizing kind of  good. Id.  396-97,  440, 543-44.
661d.  362.
671d. 546.
68 A  need  for  such  adjustments  also  to  some  extent  mars  the  structural  nicety  of
justice  as fairness.  Says Rawls:
Aln  equal  division  of all primary  goals is  irrational in  view of  the possibility  of
bettering  everyone's  circumstances  by  accepting  certain  inequalities.  Thus  the
best solution is  to support  the primary  good  of self-respect  as far  as possible  by
the assignment  of  the basic liberties  that  can indeed be  made  equal,  defining the
same  status  for  all.  At  the same  time,  distributive  justice  as  frequently  under-
stood, justice in  the relative shares of material means,  is relegated to a subordinate
place.  Thus  we arrive  at  another  reason  for  factoring  the social  order  into  two
parts  as indicated  by  the principles  of justice.  While  these  principles  permit in-
equalities  in  return  for  contributions  that  are  for  the  benefit  of  all,  the  pre-
cedence  of liberty  entails  equality in  the social bases of esteem.
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There  is no way  the bottom's  real money income  can be  increased by
any  adjustment  of  T.  The  only  available  adjustment,  and  the  one
apparently  implied  by  the  quoted  passage,  is to  increase  T  to  some
level  ('I)  higher  than T,, such that  the top's  standard of  living  has
been  reduced to  the  point where  the standard  of  enjoyment  of  basic
goods  available  to  the bottom,  although  lower  than  that  available  at
Ty,  is relatively  high enough  to confirm  its  self-respect.  The  supposi-
tion  must be  that insofar  as  self-respect  may  be  undermined  by  low
standards  of living, this is significantly a matter of relative deprivation.
So in suggesting  that adjustments  for self-respect  may be required
in the course  of applying the difference  principle,  Rawls  must be  sup-
posing  the  possibility  of  cases  in  which  T,,  perhaps  suprisingly,  is
higher  than  T--in which  a  higher  level  of  tax-transfer  activity  is
required  to  exhaust  the  possibilities  of  confirming  the  bottom's  self-
respect than  would  maximize  its  income.  Still,  someone  might  argue
that T  should  not automatically  be set at T.  rather than at Tv--that
the question  depends  on whether the value of  E. at T.  (assuming  that
E. is zero  at all levels  of T  below T. 69)  is  enough to offset the amount










Tax-Transfer Activity  (T)
In case  (1),  T must  be increased  so  much  to  achieve  the  mini-
mum  (relative)  standard  of  living  for the  bottom which  will confirm
69See  note  65  supra & accompanying  text.CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
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the  bottom's self-respect  that the  "total"  value  of E" and E,  at T. is
less than  the value of E, alone when T is fixed at T,. The opposite is
true  in case  (2).  But it is a  mistake to  treat E,  and  E  as mutually
combinable  and  substitutable  in  this  way.  In  the  Rawlsian  vision,
income  is virtually worthless without self-respect70  So the  question  of
adjusting  the  difference  principle's  application  to  take  account  of
self-respect  boils  down  to  a conceptually  simple  idea:  If  it  is  neces-
sary,  in  order  to  confirm  the  bottom's  self-respect,  to  increase  tax-
transfer  activity  beyond  the  point  where  the  bottom's  income  is
maximized,  we are  to  do  so.
We have  thus  brought the  satisficing  good  of  self-respect within
the  maximizing  structure  of  the  difference  principle,  by showing  that
on  its  account  maximization  of  the  bottom's  prospects  may  require
tax-transfer  activity which is suboptimal  with regard  to the  bottom's
income.  In  so  doing,  we  have  come  as  far  as  we  can  in  pursuit  of
some  implication  in  the  difference  principle  of  an  insurance-rights
package. Yet the quest has failed. Through a somewhat  elusive notion
of  relative  deprivation,  we  can  see  the  possibility  that  an  existing
state  of  distribution  might  be  perceived  as  unjust  because  of  the
bottom's inability to satisfy certain needs,  considered in the  compara-
tive  light  of  what  others  are  able  to  enjoy.  But  there  are  only  two
possible  remedies  for  such  a  situation.  The  preferred  remedy,  ex-
pected to suffice  in most cases,  is to  raise the bottom's  real income to
7oSee  RAw.ns  440,  535.  It  is  true  that Raws speaks  in  passing, id. 362,  of assigning
relative  weights  to  self-respect  and  income  in  arriving  at  an  index  of  the  bottom's
prospects.  But  this  view  seems  so sharply  at  odds  with  the  subsequent,  more  compre-
hensive  elucidation  of  self-respect  that it should  perhaps  be disregarded.
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the  maximum  achievable  level.  As  we  have  already  seen,71  there are
no  insurance-rights  implications  in that approach.  An  additional  pos-
sible  remedy-the  one  brought  to  light  by the  introduction  of  self-
respect  as  a primary social  good-is  taxation  and  transfer  calculated
to reduce  both the top's and  the bottom's real incomes,  but to  reduce
the top's at a faster  rate so  as to narrow  the relative-deprivation  gap.
But this is hardly  a remedy that one would  associate with the idea  of
insurance  rights.
Though we  have finished  our exploration  of the  difference  princi-
ple,  we  have  not yet  finished with  the primary  good  of  self-respect.
Before  continuing  with  our  examination  of  it72 it  will  be helpful  to
see  what  the  opportunity  and  liberty  principles  might  have  to  con-
tribute to a notion  of constitutional  welfare  rights.
b.  The Opportunity Principle
This  principle  requires a degree  of compensatory  service  to what
we could call the  "priming"  needs  of each individual,  as by provision
of  basic  education.  Rawls  does  not  say  that  any education  must  be
publicly  provided  in  kind,  or that  any  compensatory  right  regarding
education  cannot  be satisfied  by  general  monetary  transfers.  But  by
attaching  this  right  to  the  lexically  preferred  opportunity  principle,
Rawls  must  mean  that  it has  to  be  satisfied  before  the  difference
principle  can  be  allowed  to operate-that  compensatory  satisfaction
of  the  opportunity  interest  is  a  prerequisite  to  allowing  any  income
inequalities  to  arise  in  the  marketplace.  It  seems  to  follow  that  no
one may be precluded  from the requisite education by income shortage;
and  this  would  be,  then,  an  insurance  right.  Even  so,  it  might  not
generate  a  clearly  justiciable  claim  unless  its  extent  could  be  more
precisely determined.
Now although the expression "fair  equality of opportunity"  seems
to suggest  an intuitionistic criterion  of how far to cut  into  dispositive
liberty  on  behalf  of  opportunity,  the  theory  as  a  whole  may  give
stronger  guidance.  Rawls believes  his  contractarian  construct  should
generate  assurances  of  educational  offset  for  environmental  accidents
of background  and upbringing, but not for genetic accidents of inheri-
tance. 7' This distinction  may not defy translation  into  social policy. 4
71 Text  accompanying  notes  43-60  supra.
72 Text accompanying  notes  77-80 infra.
73Any further  compensation  for  disadvantage  in  the  natural-talents  lottery  is  to  be
of the  less-than-fully-offsetting  type implied by  the difference  principle.  See RAwLs  73-75,
511.
74 See I  CAL.  GEN.  Ass.,  SENATE SELxcT Comm.  ON  ScHOOL DisnucT  FNANcE,  FnTAL
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If  in  the  present  state  of  educational  technology  it  does  not  yield
claims so determinate  as  to be justiciable, that it may someday  yield
them is perhaps  not unimaginable.
The  scope  of welfare  rights implied by the opportunity principle
may  not  be  limited  to  goods  which  are  strictly  "educational."  Un-
accompanied by subsistence  or  health or  freedom  from extreme  envi-
ronmental  deprivation,  how could  educational  offerings  effectuate  fair
equality of opportunity?  The priority of the opportunity principle  over
the difference  principle and that of dispositive  liberty must mean that
education's  effective  biological  entailments,  whatever  they  are,  must
be  satisfied  as  a prior  condition  to  reliance  on  the  pure  procedural
justice  of  the market-even  supposing  that such reliance  would  tend
to maximize  the bottom's real-income  expectations,  thus  satisfying the
difference  principle. If so,  the catalogue  of welfare  rights would  reach
beyond  educational  goods  and  (at  least  with  regard  to  persons  of
educable  age)  into  welfare  domains  which we  tend to  associate  with
the difference  principle  and the  social minimum.  And these  additional
rights  seem  more justiciable  than  the core  education  claim itself,  and
more justiciable  under the opportunity principle than under the differ-
ence  principle.  It  seems  possible  to  arrive at  somewhat  objective  and
nonrelativistic  descriptions  of  the  levels  of  subsistence,  health,  and
environmental  amenity  necessary  to  make  persons  receptive  to  edu-
cational  offerings.
c.  The Liberty Principle
Enjoyment  of  basic  liberties,  like  enjoyment  of  educational  op-
portunity,  has  fairly  straightforward  and  objective  biological  entail-
ments.  Thus  the  right  to  provision  of  these  may  rank  with  liberty
among  the  social  priorities  established  by  the  theory  of  justice  as
fairness. Rawls  so indicates  when  he says  that the priority  of liberty
over  satisfaction  of  material  wants  is  not  unqualified,  that  in  some
circumstances  the lexically  articulated conception  of justice  may have
to give way to a "general  conception"  which permits  trade-offs  among
all social values-liberty  along with material goods-as  long  as  those
trade-offs  satisfy the  difference  principle.75  This line  of thought leads
to a division of material wants into those which are and are not basic:
To be sure, it is not the  case that when the priority of
liberty  holds,  all  material  wants  are  satisfied.  Rather  these
desires  are not so  compelling  as  to  make it rational  for the
persons  in  the  original position  to  agree  to  satisfy  them  by
accepting a less than equal freedom....  Until the basic wants
75 See RAwLs  62,  303.
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of  individuals  can  be  fulfilled,  the  relative  urgency  of  their
interest  in  liberty  cannot  be  firmly  decided  in  advance.  It
will depend on the  claims  of  the least favored  as  seen  from
the constitutional  and legislative  stages.  But under favorable
circumstances  the  fundamental  interest  in  determining  our
plan  of  life  eventually  assumes  a prior place. 6
d.  Justice as Fairness as a Whole
The good  of  self-respect  seems  to play a dual role in the  theory
of justice as fairness. It is, as we have seen,  one of the primary goods,
along  with  income  and  wealth,  with  respect  to  which  the  difference
principle demands  that the  bottom's  prospects  be  maximized.  In this
role  self-respect  may  be  said  to  be  coordinate  with  income  and
wealth" 7  and  subordinate  to  rights  and  liberties,  in  the  lexicon  of
primary  social  goods.  But  there  is  another  perspective  in which  con-
firmation  and nurture  of  self-respect  are  the  end and  objective  of  all
the  principles  of  justice  taken  together.  In  this  perspective,  self-
respect  is the  preeminent  social  good,  superordinate  even  to  rights
and liberties. The liberty principle,  the opportunity  principle, and  the
difference principle--each separately and all in their convergent impact
-are  elaborated  and  justified  in  terms  of  their  tendency  to  instill
and  safeguard  self-respect;  and  insofar  as  it is  feared  that  one  or
another  of these principles  in isolation  may be insufficiently  solicitous
of  self-respect, it is shown  how one  or  another of  the other principles
may  counteract  this  concern."  Self-respect  thus  becomes  a  central
element  in  the justification  of  the  whole theory.
It  follows  that if welfare  rights  can  be  shown  essential  to  self-
respect, in any sense additional to those in which the difference,  oppor-
tunity, and liberty principles severally imply such rights, the theory of
justice  as  fairness implies  them  in this  additional  sense  as well.  Thus
the  difference  principle  implies  welfare  rights in  the  elusive  form  of
whatever  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  undermining  of  self-respect  by
relative  deprivation.  The  opportunity  and  liberty  principles  imply
welfare  rights as more objective, less relativistic  biological  entailments
of  opportunity  and  liberty.  In  addition,  the  central  and  preeminent
good  of  self-respect  may imply welfare  rights  reaching  beyond  those
biological  entailments,  and  not  depending  on  notions  of  relative  de-
privation  for  their  justification.  Perhaps,  for  example,  self-respect
requires  the  opportunity  to  be  creative  in  some  medium  which  gives
76 1d. 543.
77But  more  precisely  it  seems  to  be  a  condition  of  the  enjoyment  of income  and
wealth.  See text accompanying  note  70  supra.
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pleasure to others-artistic performance, crafts, sport, or whatever 79 - -
though perhaps no one would say that he was degraded  by not having
had  such  opportunities,  or  that  his  educational  offering  or  civil  and
political  liberties were  rendered  worthless without it.
Professor  Fried  has  suggested  that  it  would  be  possible  to
"[elaborate]  a  comprehensive  theory  of  rights  within  the  terms  of
Rawis'  general  scheme."8  The  foregoing  discussion  should  confirm
that  this  is  indeed  possible  for  welfare  rights,  although  it seems  to
require  some verbal  modification  of the  "general  scheme"  of  lexically
articulated principles of justice. Somewhere  near the top of the priority
list  there  belongs  a  "welfare  rights"  principle,  signifying  that  the
questions  of  maximizing  the  bottom's position  with regard  to  money
income  and  wealth,  and  even  of  protecting  the  bottom  against  the
degrading effects of relative deprivation,  are simply not to be addressed
until  provision  for  some  articulated  package  of  basic  welfare  needs
has been secured.
In  sum, it is  a mistake  to  think  of  the  social  minimum  as  an
institutional feature linked  specifically and peculiarly  to the difference
principle  (whereas  democracy  or a bill of  rights, say, would  be asso-
ciated with the liberty  principle).  The social  minimum  is  an implica-
tion of justice as fairness taken as a whole theory. While the difference
principle taken in isolation seems to have a simple, maximizing thrust,
that is not true of the whole theory. The  theory as  a whole  reflects a
degree  of  risk  aversion,  imputing  to  representative  persons  a  struc-
tured set of priorities under which the question of generally amplifying
one's income  simply is not reached until  adequate assurance  has been
made  for  what  one  specifically  needs  in  order  that his  basic  rights,
liberties,  and opportunities  may be  effectively  enjoyed,  and his  self-
respect  maintained.
B.  Judicial Role
The principles  of justice as we have been exploring them  are part
of an  ideal theory of justice  as fairness. The ideal, to which an appro-
priate  conception  of justice is  to be wedded,  is that of a "well-ordered
society"--"one  designed  to  advance  the  good  of  its  members  and
effectively regulated by a public conception  of justice,""1  or, as Rawls
sometimes  says,  one which is in "a  state of  near  justice."'  A central
part  of  the  argument  for  justice  as  fairness  is  that it meets  the  test
79 See id. 440-42.
80 Fried, Book  Review, 85  HARv.  L. REV.  1691,  1697  (1972).
81 R  wVEs  453.  See  generally id. 453-62.
82d. 351.
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of stability-that when constitutional and  statutory arrangements,  and
the institutions they help to shape, are seen to conform to the principles
of  justice  they  will,  by virtue  of  that  conformity,  command  the  con-
tinuing,  mutually  reinforcing  support  of  a citizenry  whose  members
perceive  both one  another's acknowledgment  of the principles  and  the
inclination of their shared institutions to conform.8 3 The essential point
here, for our purposes, is  that the principles  of justice  are chosen  and
tested,  for stability as  well  as other  qualities,  on the supposition of  a
society which  is  well-ordered with  respect to  those  very  principles.
This  is ideal theory.  "[J]ustice  as  fairness is  framed  to  accord  with
[the]  idea of  [a well-ordered]  society." 4  The  question  is  whether  a
societal  system,  once  publicly founded  on  the principles of  justice,
will then be in a stable equilibrium state which is good for its members.
Now  one may ask  whether  this  ideal  conception  of  justice  in  a
well-ordered  society  has  any place  for  the  "judicial  review"  part  of
our  traditional  model  of  the  constitutionalized  legal  order.  In  ideal
theory,  constitution-making  is  a  hypothetical  step  in  contractarian
derivation  of  procedures  and  rules  for a society  supposed  to be  well-
ordered.  We  assume  that  the  veil  of  ignorance  worn  in  the  original
position  has been lifted  to the point  where  participants  in  the consti-
tutional convention have knowledge  of the basic  traits of their society,
such as its material  wealth, technological  capabilities,  sophistication  in
economic  and  sociological  matters  and  the  like-what  we  could  call
the  society's  "evolutionary  circumstances."  The  particular  situations
and  traits of the  parties  remain,  as  in the  original position,  unknown
to them. In this  contextually  enriched  forum  the framers  choose  rules
and practices,  somewhat  more  specific  than  the  principles  of  justice,
designed  for  optimal  implementation  of  those  principles  in  their
society. 5
There  is  no  doubt that  a constitution  thus fashioned  for  a well-
ordered  society  might  set  up  an  independent  magistracy  and  fence
it out  of  the  legislative  domain,  to  provide  a neutral  and  politically
detached  forum for  settling disputes  over  the meaning  of legislatively
approved  legal  rules  and  principles,  and  for  assuring  their  fair  and
83 See id.  4-5,  138,  454-55.
8
4 Id.  454.
Best  of  all, a theory should present a description  of  an ideally just state of affairs,
a  conception  of  a  well-ordered  society  such  that  the  aspiration  to  realize  this
state  of  affairs,  and  to  maintain  it in  being,  answers  to  our  good  and  is  con-
tinuous  with  our  natural  sentiments.  A  perfectly  just society  should  be  part  of
an ideal  that rational  human  beings  could  desire  more  than  anything  else  once
they had  full knowledge  and experience  of what it was.
Id. 477  (footnote omitted).
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nondiscriminatory  application. 86  But  it is  far  less  clear  whether  or
why  such  a  constitution  would  give  a  judicial  branch  authority  to
enforce,  against  the  will  of  the  legislative  branch,  either  "natural
rights 8 1 7  or constitutional  rights  which directly  and visibly  implement
natural rights.
In ideal  theory,  the  original  position  and  the  constitutional  and
legislative  stages  are  distinguished  from  one  another  only  by  the
amount and specificity  of information  supposed to  be available  about
the society  and its problems  and needs-and, accordingly,  the  appro-
priate  level  of  generality  for  the  promulgated  rules,  practices,  and
institutional arrangements."  Ideal framers  are seen as none  other than
the  imaginary  "representative  persons"  of  the  original  position,  who
have simply shifted  their  discussions  over  to the  constitutional  stage,
having once agreed  on the governing principles  of justice and  received
information  about  their  society's  evolutionary  circumstances. 8 9 Rawis
seems  to think  of ideal legislators  as persons  actually chosen  for this
office under  the procedures  approved  at the constitutional stage."  But
their  behavior  should be  no  different  than  if  we  imagine  them  to be
the same set of law-givers,  now twice  removed from the  original posi-
tion and exposed to the fuller information  appropriate to the legislative
stage.  Consistent  with  the  assumption,  arguendo,  of  a  society  well-
ordered  with  regard  to  the  principles  of  justice,  and  with  the  fully
argued  position  that  those  principles  are stable,  it appears  that  ideal
legislators  must tend  to act in such  a way as  to make judicial  review
superfluous.
The  argument  for  the  stability  of  justice  as  fairness  explicitly
rejects any notion  of  the legislative  system as  a "fairness  machine"91
deliberately  constructed  so  as  to harness,  in market-like  fashion,  the
selfish  drives  of legislators  and their  constituents  in  such a way that
the  vector  sum  of  these  drives  corresponds  with  something  we  are
pleased  to  call  the  (or  a)  "public  interest."92  (Had  that  been  the
approach,  one  might  have  speculated  as  to  a role  for judicial  review
86 See id.  238-40.
87 1  am  using  the  term  "natural  rights"  to  mean  rights  implied  by  principles  of
justice  in a  coherent  philosophical  theory  of justice.
8 8 See  RAwLs  198-99.
89 See  id.  196-97.
9
0  See id.  198,  356-58.
91For  discussion  of  this  concept,  see  Michelman,  Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments  on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80  HAnv.  L. Rv.
1165,  1246  (1967).
92 See  RAwLS  359-61,  493,  explaining  that a "fairness  machine"  is  not operative.  For
a contrasting  view of  society  that would  have  to  rely  on a fairness-machine  notion,  see
id.  455,  521-22.  For  one  extended  development  of  such  a  notion,  see  A.  DowNs,  A.r
EcoNomic  THEORY  OF DEmOcRAcy  (1957).
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on  occasions  of  more  or  less  obvious  breakdown  of  the  fairness
machine.)93  And  Rawls  shows  no  affinity  for  the  related  idea  of  a
division  of  labor  between  legislature  and  reviewing  court,  in  which
it is the special virtue of the legislature  to be a forum  for the vigorous
free  play of interests groping towards  optimal accommodation,  and of
the  court to  be  a  kind of  superego,  backstopping  the  process  when
its  vigor  and enthusiasm  carry  it beyond  the  established  bounds  of
constitutionalized  moral principle.94  Rather,  Rawls argues  strenuously
that, given a society well-ordered with regard to his proposed principles
of  justice,  the  resulting  sense  of  justice  of  legislators  and  their  con-
stituents-and  their  perception  that  it is  consistent  with  their  good
that  they should  have  this  sense--will  work  effectively  to  keep  the
system on course.95
The  claim  is  not  that there  will never  be  legislative  deviations
from  what  perfect  justice,  perfectly  understood,  would  dictate.  The
method  of  moral  argument  indicated  by  the  criterion  of  "stability"
accepts an opposite assumption  that the proposed  principles  of justice
will sometimes be  violated  even in an ideally constituted  regime.  It  is
from that assumption that the moral theorist then proceeds  to support
his  favored  principles  by showing  how  strongly  their public  recogni-
tion will tend to engender in the populace  a sense  of justice  which, in
turn, will work to ensure that the inevitable  legislative  deviations  will
be  temporary. 0  Civil  disobedience  may be regarded  as  the most  dra-
matic  manifestation  of  the  stabilizing  public  sense  of  justice.1 7  Less
dramatic, but more germane  for our purposes, is the simple notion that
ideal legislators  themselves  are  citizens,  animated  no  less  than others
by the  sense of  justice. They  are, accordingly,  expected  to  engage  in
mutual  discussion  and  pooling  of  judgments  about  what  is  just and
(secondarily)  efficient  under  the  circumstances.  Votes  are  counted,
and  the  majority  rules,  only  because  in  problematic  situations  that
is thought not  a bad way to  arrive  at sound  judgments,  and  because
that  procedure  is  consistent  with  the  liberty  principle's  demand  for
equal participatory  rights. 8
93 For example,  consider  the notion of  "invidious  classifications"  discussed  in Micbel-
man, supra note  17, at 19-20.
94 For a more  complete  articulation  of this idea,  see A. BicxE,  THM  LrAST DANGER-
ous  BRANcH  24-26,  95  (1962).
95 See  RAWLS  493.
96 See id.  458.
97 See id.  364-68.
98 See id. 356-62.  The  need  for  majority  rule  as  distinguished  from  the principle  of
unanimity which  governs  the  original  position  and,  presumably,  the  constitutional  stage
arises  from  the greater  richness  of factual  context at  the legislative  stage.
The  restrictions on information  [applicable  at the  legislative stage;  i.e., the ideal
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Now once the possibility is conceded  of legislative  error and dis-
turbance  of  equilibrium,  even in  a well-ordered  society,  we  may  ask
whether a role is not thereby  opened  for judicial review-that  is, the
role of calling attention to and demanding  correction of mistakes when
they do  occur,  of  activating  the  temporarily  lapsed  sense  of  justice
and  catalyzing  the  process  whereby  that  sense  regains  control.  The
question,  particularly  acute  in  the case  of welfare  rights,  is why  we
should suppose that occupancy of judicial  office will reflect any special
ability  to  perform  this  role.  Surely  Rawls  is correct  when  he  writes
that even in ideal circumstances,
judgment  [regarding economic and social policies]  frequently
depends  upon  speculative  political  and  economic  doctrines
and upon social theory generally. Often  the best that we can
say of a law or policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust.
• . . It  is often  perfectly  plain  and  evident  when  the  equal
liberties are violated  ....  But this state of affairs is compara-
tively  rare  with  social  and  economic  policies  regulated  by
the  difference  principle 9
Thus  it may be doubted  (and Rawls  doubts) 1 00  that, under the infor-
mational  constraints  of  the constitutional  stage,  welfare  rights  could
be  articulated  prudently  at that  stage  with  much  greater  specificity
than  that  already  contained  in  the  principles  of  justice  themselves;
and, if not, that judicial officers  could contribute  anything worthwhile
to  recognition  and articulation  of  such  rights at  the  legislative  stage.
The argument  against judicial  review for welfare  rights  (in ideal
theory)  is yet stronger than this. While the gains to be expected  from
this institution are  unclear,  certain  costs  are clear. The  right to maxi-
mum mutual political liberty implies a democratic  form of government
not  guarantee  agreement  [as  in  the  prior  stages],  since  the  tendencies  of  the
general social  facts  will  often be  ambiguous  and  difficult  to  assess.
Id. 357. 00  Id.  199.  Though  Rawls  speaks  here  of "policies  regulated  by  the difference  princi-
ple,"  the context suggests that we should understand him as meaning to include all policies
regarding  the  social  minimum-a  notion  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  best  regarded  as
regulated  by  the  theory  of  justice  as  a  whole  rather  than peculiarly  by  the  difference
principle.  See text accompanying  notes  77-78  supra.
100 Rawls
imagine[s]  . . . a division  of  labor  between  stages  in  which  each  deals  with
different  questions  of  social justice.  This  division roughly  corresponds  to  the two
parts  of  the  basic  structure.  The  first  principle  of equal  liberty  is  the  primary
standard  for  the  constitutional  convention.  Its  main  requirements  are that  the
fundamental  liberties  of  the  person  and  liberty  of  conscience  and  freedom  of
thought be  protected  and  that the  political  process  as  a  whole  be  a  just  pro-
cedure.  . . . The second  principle  comes  into play  at  the stage  of  the legislature.
It  dictates  that social  and  economic- policies  be  aimed  at  maximizing  the  long-
term  expectations  of  the  least  advantaged.  . . . At  this  point the  full range  of
general  economic and social facts are brought  to bear.
RAWLS  199.
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in  which  the  legislature  is  either  composed  of  or  accountable  to  the
citizens,  and decisions  are made according to majoritarian processes. 1 0'
Rawls does  not accept  the view that  "the  political liberties  are  of less
intrinsic  importance  than  liberty  of  conscience  and  freedom  of  the
person,"  or that  "the  chief  merit  of  the  principle  of  participation  is
to  insure that the government  respects  the  rights  and  welfare  of  the
governed." 1 02  He  argues,  rather,  that  equal political  liberty  is  valued
and  enjoyed  in  its own  right,  that it  "strengthen[s]  men's  sense  of
their  own  worth,  enlarge[s]  their intellectual  and  moral  sensibilities,
and  lay[s]  the  basis  for  a  sense  of  duty  and  obligation  upon  which
the stability of just institutions depends."'
0 3 Judicial review introduces
a  sharp  and clear  inequality  of  political  voice  (concerning  what  the
principles  of  justice  or  their  constitutional  derivatives  require  in  a
given situation),  and so  can be justified, under  the first principle,  only
insofar  as it works  to  maximize  the  total system  of liberties  enjoyed
by  those  accorded  the  lesser  voice  (i.e.,  the  nonjudges)  ° 10  While
Rawls  acknowledges  that  plausible  arguments  in  this  form  can  be
made  (drawing  on  traditional  arguments  for  bills  of  rights,  concern
over majority tyranny, etc.),  he seems  inclined  to the view that these
arguments  should  be  treated  most  circumspectly  for  a well-ordered
society.1 0 5
The  foregoing  considerations  should  help  us  grasp  what  Rawls'
means  when  he  insists that  the question  of justice  and right is  to  be
held  apart  from  the  question  of  legality.  A  system  which  is  well-
ordered,  and  just on  the  whole,  may  on  particular  occasions  act  in
ways  which we  are  convinced  are  in  themselves  unjust.  On  some  of
these  occasions,  refusal  to  abide  by  the  law  may  be  appropriate.
Indeed,  the  readiness  of persons  to engage  in,  say,  civil  disobedience
on  appropriate  occasions,  and  the  potential  efficacy  of  this  conduct,
may  be  a  part  of  the  overall  makeup  of  the  society  which  leads  us
to call it well-ordered-an  important  stabilizing  element which avoids
the  affront  to  equal  liberties  inherent  in  judicial  review.  But  mostly
the  overall  justice  of  the  system  makes  it reasonable  to  expect  that
a just person will abide by occasional failures  of justice. This expecta-
tion  is a third  factor  which,  combined  with  belief  in  the  efficacy  of
the public sense of justice and the tendency of judicial review to under-
mine  equal  liberties,  suggests  that  the  better-ordered  the  society  is
101  See id.  221-23,  227.
-1 0 2 d. 229-30.
103 Id.  234.
104  See id. 229-30.
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supposed  to  be,  the  less  interested  we  become  in  the  question  of
judicially  enforceable  constitutional  rights,  especially  welfare  rights.
And so, insofar as the theory of justice as fairness is simply an expres-
sion of Rawls'  understanding  of what  a well-ordered  society would be
like, we  should not expect him to  be greatly troubled by the  theory's
questionable  ability  to generate  justiciable  welfare  rights.
II.  NONIDEAL  THEORY:  FROM  NATURAL  RIGHT  TO
POSITIVE  ENTITLEMENT
Of  course  Rawls'  effort  to  develop  an  ideal  theory  of  justice  is
not intended  as  completely  idle  speculation.  The ideal  theory  and its
counterpart  conception  of  a well-ordered  society  are  meant  to  define
a state  toward which we  should want  to move.  They  "set up  an aim
to  guide  the  course  of  social  reform."1 "  And  so  there  is  need-to
which Rawls does not generally purport to address himself-for  "non-
ideal"  theory to account for the role of justice as  fairness  in a society
which is not fully and maturely just-a society whose members do not
yet  generally  and  publicly  acknowledge  the  principles  of  justice,  or
whose material  circumstances,  or political  and social maturation,  have
not yet reached a point admitting full implementation of the principles. 07
Judicially  protected  substantive  constitutional  rights  seem  intuitively
as  plausible  in  nonideal  theory  as  they  are  dubious  in  ideal  theory,
although only in passing  does  Rawls seem  to think of the  constitution
in this way. 0  As we  have seen,  he  offers  a professedly  stylized  view
of the constitutional  convention as a hypothetical  step in contractarian
derivation of procedures  and  rules  for a well-ordered  society-that  is,
as a part of ideal theory.09
Of  course,  a society's  evolutionary  circumstances  as  disclosed  to
the  constitutional  convention  may  be  such  that  the  society  is  in  or
verging  on a  well-ordered  state,  but what if  they are  not?  What are
the  framers  to  do  if  one  of  the  evolutionary  circumstances  disclosed
to  them  is  that the  society's  members  presently  fail  to  understand,
acknowledge,  and feel  confident  of  other  people's  understanding  and
acknowledgment  of those principles  of justice to which the convention
members  themselves  are committed by virtue of their  recent encounter
in the original position?  Under such conditions  the full and immediate
implementation  of the principles  might be impossible, and  oblique  and
imperfect  forms  of implementation  might hasten  the process  whereby
106 Id.  245.
'
0 7 See id.  245-46.
108 See id.  246-47.
109See text  accompanying  notes  84-90  supra.
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their  acceptance  increases,  and  the  public  sense  of  justice  implants
itself. Thus  the  framers  of  the  constitution  might  look  toward  rules
and practices  which produce  some  optimum mix of actualizing  justice
for  the  members  of  the  present  generation  and  hastening  its  fuller
realization  for future generations.  They would then be  seeking institu-
tional  arrangements  which  could  realize  (or  improve  the  chances  of
realizing)  certain  rights  even  in  the  face  of  legislative  hostility  or
apathy,  and which  also  could proclaim rights  and principles  of justice
in  such  a  way  as  to  advance  their  public  acceptance.  Because  the
parties  would  be in  circumstances  requiring  optimization  (i.e.,  trade-
off),  they might  agree  to sacrifice  some  of the  rights  which would  be
theirs  in  a  perfectly  just  society,  or  some  aspects  of  these  rights,
including  rights  to  maximum  equal  political  voice,  for  the  sake  of
realizing  other  rights.
We can  approach  the problem of  optimization by way of  Rawls'
treatment  (scattered through various  parts of the book)"o  of the case
in which a society's state of economic  development  is so primitive that
it  cannot  produce  enough  to  satisfy  everyone's  basic  wants-those
which have  to be satisfied  before it makes  sense to talk  of enjoyment
of any liberties,  much less  of equal liberties."'  To the extent that such
conditions  make  impossible  the  full and  immediate  realization  of  the
principles  of  justice, and  especially  the priority  of the  equal liberties,
they permit  relaxation  of  the  lexical  priority  rules-relaxation  which
may lead all the way back to the  "general conception"  of justice  con-
sisting  of  the  difference  principle  alone." 2  Specifically,  equality  of
political  voice  may be suspended.  "[I] t may  be  reasonable  to  forego
[this  equality]  when  the long-run  benefits  are  great  enough  to  trans-
form  a less fortunate  society into one where  the  equal liberties  can be
fully  enjoyed."
' 3
Does parallel  reasoning hold  when  it is  underdevelopment  of  the
society's sense of justice, rather than of its productive  capacity, which
makes  impossible  the  full and  immediate  realization  of  the principles
of justice? If so we might have isolated the germ of a Rawlsian account
of  substantive  constitutional  rights  and judicial  review.
But matters  are not so simple.  The cases  of  economic  and  moral
underdevelopment  stand  quite  differently  with  respect  to  the  stipula-
tions  governing  the  original position.  On  the  one  hand, knowledge  of
the society's  material  circumstances  is  specifically  withheld  from  the
110 E.g.,  RAwLs  247,  300-01,  542-44.
"'I See id. 543.
112 See  text accompanying  note  75  supra.
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parties;  and this is  why a sliding-scale  conception  of  justice  emerges
which is adaptable to the whole imaginable range of such circumstances
-proposing  a rather  firm  set of priority rules  for  societies  beyond a
certain  level  of  material  comfort,  a  simple  general  conception  for
societies  below a certain level of poverty,  and, by implication,  a con-
tinuous  series  of  progressively  relaxed  priority  systems  for  societies
in intermediate  stages.  On  the  other hand,  it is  expressly  stipulated
that  "in assessing  conceptions  of  justice  the  persons  in  the  original
position  are to  assume  that the  one  they  adopt will  be  strictly  com-
plied  with.  The  consequences  of  their  agreement  are  to  be  worked
out on  this  basis."' 1 14  Should it later be  disclosed  to the  parties,  now
acting  as  a  constitutional  convention,  that this  assumption  does  not
hold  for  their  society,  one  might  think  they  have  no  choice  but  to
disband.  The  only principles they  have  available  for  appraising  pro-
posed constitutions are, it turns out, partly based on a false assumption.
Yet it would be grotesquely  trivializing  to regard ideal  theory as
relevant  only  for  societies  already  verging  on  perfection  as  defined
by its precepts.  The  assumption  of strict  compliance  is  a part of  the
method proposed  for  deriving principles,  not a restriction  on the rele-
vance  or  applicability  of whatever  principles  are  derived  through  the
method.  On  the  contrary, the very purpose  of  deriving  the principles
must be to help us clarify  our notions  of what  is to be done when  the
strict-compliance  assumption  fails.
So,  for  illustration,  if  the  assumption  fails  at  the  legislative  or
postlegislative  stage,  Rawls  contemplates  corrective  measures  appro-
priate  to that stage,  such as civil  disobedience.  And if the assumption
should  fail at the  constitutional stage-if  the information  appropriate
to that stage should disclose  a failure  of the assumption-there  seems
no  reason not  to  consider  the  introduction  of  corrective  measures  at
that  stage.  Plausible  correctives  would  include  substantive  constitu-
tional rights and judicial review." 5
But to  consider  does not necessarily  mean  to  embrace.  Substan-
tive  rights and judicial  review, though plausible  devices  for coping  at
the  constitutional  stage with underdevelopment  of  the public  sense  of
11
4 Id. 145.
115 The analogy  may  seem imperfect  insofar  as we  regard  effective  civil disobedience
as a manifestation  of well-orderedness  rather than  as a device  for  coping with its absence.
Compare text accompanying  note  97  supra with  text accompanying  note  105  supra. Yet
on  inspection  this symptomatic  view  of  civil  disobedience  seems  to  mean  simply  that it
is only in societies where  the public sense  of justice  has passed  a certain  level  of develop-
ment that we should expect to  see  resort to  this device  or think it  appropriate  or poten-
tially  effective.  We  shall  find  it  possible  to  offer  similar  statements  about  substantive
constitutional  rights.
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justice, may on close examination be  found unacceptable,  or acceptable
only within rather strict limits.
The case  for judicial review remains harder than that for relaxing
the  priority  of  liberty  in  the  face  of  material  shortage.  A  society
which  cannot  produce  enough  to  satisfy  everyone's  basic  wants  is,
by  definition,  not  a  society  in  which  "equal  liberties  can  be  fully
enjoyed.""  For  that  reason,  it  is  not  ultimately  repugnant  to  the
priority  of  liberty  to  allow  severe  or  unequal  restrictions  of  liberty
now, if these  measures  are  found  necessary  to  boost productivity  to
the point where  full and equal  liberty can be truly realized later. Only
in  a superficial  sense  can  one  even  say  that the  priority  of liberty  is
relaxed in this case;  at a deeper level, that priority is fully respected.",
Now  once  a  material  base  sufficient  to  satisfy  everyone's  basic
wants is  assured,  and  only a  deficient  public sense  of justice  impedes
full realization of the principles, is there still room to argue that equal
political  liberty  may  be  restricted  (by judicial  review,  for  example)
for  liberty's  sake?  The  argument  is  plausible  insofar  as  judicial  re-
view  would  be  singularly  effective  in  realizing  basic  liberties  (e.g.,
rights  to  free speech  and equal voting)  or rights  to  the  fulfillment  of
everyone's  basic wants  on which enjoyment  of these  liberties  depends.
But  use  of  judicial  review  to  vindicate  welfare  rights  not  strictly
associated  with  the  basic  liberties'"  would  flatly  contradict  the  pri-
ority of liberty. Once  the basic  liberties  and  their effective  enjoyment
have been assured  to  all, justice  as  fairness  might  well insist  that all
other claims  gain  recognition  in the participatory  forum.  Should it be
the case  that the requisite  public sense of justice  is  currently lacking,
it may  also  be  the  case  that entrusting  its nurture  to judicial  review
will,  paradoxically,  indefinitely  stunt  the  growth  of  this  sense.  The
answer depends  on the facts  of human psychology,  and  the notion  of
the  priority  of  liberty  reflects  a  view  of  those  facts  which  cautions
against  judicial  review.  Equality  of  political  participation,  it  bears
repeating,  "lay[s]  the  basis  for  a sense  of  duty and  obligation  upon
which  the  stability  of just  institutions  depends.""' 9  Moreover,
as the conditions  of civilization improve, the marginal signifi-
cance for our good of further economic and social advantages
diminishes  relative  to the  interests  of  liberty, which  become
stronger  as the  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  the equal  free-
doms  are  more  fully  realized.  . . .Increasingly  it  becomes
11
6  See text accompanying  note  113 supra.
117 Rawls  regards  the  parties  in  the  original  position  as  speaking  for  "continuing
lines  of  claims,"  or  "as  representatives  of  families."  RAwas  128.
11
8  See  text accompanying  notes  72-75  supra.
11
9See text  accompanying  note  103 supra.CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
more  important to secure the free internal  life of the various
communities of interests in which persons and groups  seek to
achieve,  in  modes  of  social union  consistent  with  equal  lib-
erty, the  ends and  excellences  to which  they  are  drawn.  In
addition  men  come to aspire  to some  control  over  the  laws
and  rules  that regulate  their  association,  either  by  directly
taking  part  themselves  in  its  affairs  or  indirectly  through
representatives  with whom they  are affiliated  by ties  of  cul-
ture  and  social  situation.
...  [Material desires beyond the basic wants]  are not so
compelling  as  to  make  it  rational  for  the  persons  in  the
original position to agree to satisfy them by accepting a less
than equal freedom....  One reason for this...  is the central
place  of  the primary  good  of  self-respect  and  the  desire  of
human beings  to express  their  nature in  a free  social  union
with others' 0
Yet we  must not  forget that welfare  rights,  even  those  reaching
beyond  fulfillment  of  basic wants,  also  have  a role  in  promoting  the
self-respect  in whose  absence  the  sense  of  justice  will not  flourish-
the  same  self-respect,  indeed,  that  the  equal  liberties  are  meant  to
serve.''  There  may,  then,  be  a  role  for  constitutionalized  welfare
rights even after it appears  that everyone  has,  so  to speak,  enough to
eat. So there we have  the uneasy  case  for judicially  enforceable,  sub-
stantive  constitutional  rights as  a means  of  coping with  evolutionary
deficiencies  in  the  public's  sense  of  justice.  In  order  to  secure  the
enforcement  of  certain  rights,  all  looking  ultimately  to  self-respect,
the framers might be prepared to sacrifice some of their rights of equal
political  liberty by authorizing politically  aloof  courts  to override  the
popular legislative will. If so, the foregoing  discussion  shows  that they
would  certainly  try to  limit  that  sacrifice  by  insisting that  any such
interventions  be  convincingly  supportable  by  argument  appealing  to
widely  shared  premises.
The  framers  might  try  to  write  all  such  premises  specifically
into the constitution  (as  in a bill of rights).  Or they might also permit
the reviewing judges to invoke such other precepts  as are  found latent
in  popular  morality.  Revealing,  clarifying,  and  rationalizing  such
latent  moral  principles  might  be  deemed  an  important  part  of  the
court's work. Judicial  review  of the latter  sort seems  to carry greater
threats  to  the  self-respect  cherished  by  the  equal-liberty  principle
than review strictly anchored  to specific  constitutional  texts.  So  even
if the latter sort of judicial review  were permitted, the  framers would
.20 RAVV  542-43.
1
2 1 See text accompanying notes  62-70,  77-79 supra.
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try to minimize  any harm to  self-respect  by making  premises  explicit
in  the  constitution when they  could.  And  the  resultant  constitutional
statement  of  rights  would  be  in  a  form  (say,  of  insurance  rights)
which might depart  from what the ideal theory would imply in a well-
ordered  society  in  which  judicial  review  was  not  important.
If  a given  society's  public sense  of justice  appeared  to  the  con-
stitutional  convention  to be  so underdeveloped that judicial review  of
legislation  action  would  on  the  whole  advance  the  cause  of  justice,
the convention could not expect that there would be,  at the legislative
stage,  much  convergence  of  judgment  on  the  size  or  makeup  of  the
just  social  minimum,  or  much  hope  for  arguing  persuasively  that
persons  were  receiving  less  than  the  minimum,  or  much  reason  for
confidence  that  the  legislature  by  itself  would  satisfy  the  minimum
requirement. 2 2  But the parties  to the constitutional  convention would
not want to give up completely their welfare  claims.  They might want
to  create  justiciable  rights  which  would  go  a significant  distance  to-
ward  fulfilling  those  claims.  And  even  apart  from  their  reliance  on
judicial review, they might want to state some welfare rights  in a form
which  could  provide  a  ground  for  persuasive  argument  in  political
forums  at  an  evolutionary  stage  in  which  popular  perceptions  and
judgments  about  distributive-share  justice  were  still  rather  clouded;
such rights would serve  as surrogates  for the elusive claim to a proper
social minimum.  Moreover,  the framers  would be concerned  to  estab-
lish  a  political  regime  which  would  be  reasonably  workable--one
which could know  when it has satisfied  the background  conditions  of
distributive-share  justice,  and  visibly  seem  to  have  satisfied  them,
so  as  to  be  justified  in  turning  to  other  matters.  Thus  the  framers
might resort  to a rather  specific  catalogue  of  wants  (on  the  order  of
decent  food  and  shelter,  health  care,  a basic education,  and  effective
access  to judicial forums)  which  they could with reasonable  certainty
agree  would have  to  be satisfied  (given  what  they  know  about  their
society's  economic  circumstances  and  social  and  political  develop-
ment).  That  is,  they might at the constitutional stage be able to agree
that the social minimum would  provide  everyone with at least enough
to  assure  satisfaction  of  certain  wants,  even  if  they  could  not agree
how  much more  or what  else was  in justice  required.
In  order  that  these  rights  might  gain  effective  support  from  a
publicly  acceptable  form of  judicial  review  and  from  convincing  ad-
vocacy in political  forums,  the framers  might choose  to state  them as
insurance  rights  rather  then  as  assurances  of  economic  opportunity
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(and  general  transfer  programs)  sufficient  to  fulfill  important  needs
as  and  when  they  accrue.  Assurances  of  the latter  sort,  though  pre-
ferred in ideal theory"  and perhaps  also superior from the standpoint
of  efficiency,  would hold no particular  attraction  at the  constitutional
stage in our supposed  nonideal situation;  for they would  give  neither
courts  nor  advocates  any special  foothold  for  challenging  legislative
judgments. If a list of insurance rights did emerge, it might be a good
deal  less  specific  as  to  service  levels  than  as  to types  of  needs.  For
reasons to be developed below, the framers might believe that interplay
between the legislature and the courts would tend towards  satisfactory
service levels,  once the constitution  had triggered the attention of both
branches  to the  types  of  needs  in  question.
III.  THE  PLACE  OF  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN
CONSTITUTIONAL  ADJUDICATION
Two  features  of  the  suggested  nonideal  account  of  substantive
constitutional  rights and judicial  review  deserve  emphasis:  First, the
account does not purport in any way to be an historical version,  even
a stylized or Procrustean one, of how written constitutions,  substantive
,rights,  and  judicial  review  have  actually  evolved.  It  is,  rather,  an
explanation  in  principle  of how these  institutions  may, in  terms  of  a
certain  theory  of justice,  be  harmoniously  understood  and  related  to
other  extant  institutions  and,  more  critically,  to  supposed  underlying
ends  (such  as  democracy  and self-respect)  with which  judicially  en-
forced  substantive  rights  may  sometimes  seem  discordant.  Second,
this is on its face an account only of why a certain class of guaranties
might be written into a  constitution,  in contemplation  of possible  vin-
dication  by  such  means  as  judicial  review  and  legislative  advocacy.
It  does  not  fully  specify  the  guaranties  that  should  be  included,  or
treated  as if included  when they are  not, although our  exploration  of
the  substantive  welfare  content  of  ideal  theory'2  may  provide  some
clues.
An account of this sort may have practical  and evaluative  import
for  current  legislative  and  judicial  behavior.  For,  I  believe,  this  be-
havior and our understanding of it are conditioned primarily by a need
for  contemporary  coherence  and  comprehensibility,  and  only  sec-
ondarily by historical  reconstruction  of  the  framers'  intent.25
123 See  note  43  supra &  accompanying  text.
124 Text  accompanying  notes  21-80 supra.
125 Why  do  we  or should  we  try  to  reconstruct  what  the  framers  had  specifically
in mind,  in  the  course  of  deciding what  we  are now  to  make  of  the texts  they wrote?
Is  it  not  because  we  think  that  in  the  process  of  attempting  such  reconstruction  we
10031004  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  121:962
A.  Moral Theory as a Direct Source of Rights:
The  Case for Judicial Restraint
Let us,  heroically,  suppose ourselves  satisfied  that  Rawis'  theory
of justice  as fairness suggests certain  constitutional welfare  rights as  a
way of doing justice in a society generally structured  as ours is and in
like  evolutionary  circumstances;  that the  theory  further  implies  an
institution  of  judicial  review  competent  to  demand  fulfillment  of  at
least  some substantive  rights;  and,  finally, that the  theory  ultimately
succeeds  in justifying  itself  in  terms  of  coherence  with  moral  views
that we  can  confidently say are those  of the society  at large-that is,
it  persuasively  accounts  for  and  lends  harmonious  meaning  to  the
generality  of  the society's  public  institutions  and  practices,  including
constitutional  texts  and traditions  and  other  official  and  popular  ex-
pressions  of  goals  and  ideals.'  Given  those  suppositions,  are  we to
shall  often  encounter  clues  and  reminders  of  principles  and  notions  (perhaps  the  only
principles  and  notions)  which  can set  those  texts  in  coherent  and  comprehensible  rela-
tion  to  one  another  and  to the  whole  set  of  arrangements  under  which  we  continue  to
live,  but  whose  informing  ideas  we  sometimes  lose  sight  of?  Insofar  as  that  is  our
quest,  nonhistorical  accounts  would  seem  to  have  a  competitive  claim  on  our  atten-
tions,  according  to  their  felt  explanatory  power.
126  E.g.,  Housing Act  of 1949, 42  U.S.C.  §§  1441-43  (1971).  "The  Congress  hereby  de-
clares  that  the  general  welfare  and  security  of  the  Nation  and  the  health  and  living
standards  of  its  people  require  . .. the  realization  as  soon  as  feasible  of  the  goal  of
a  decent home  and  a  suitable  living environment  for  every  American  family  .. . ."  Id.
§  1441.
Professor  Feinberg's  lucid  description  of  the  "coherence  logic  of  ethical  justification"
will serve  well at  this point to remind  us  of what  Rawls,  as a  "coherence  theorist,"  is  up
to:
[Coherence  theorists]  do  not  believe  it  possible  to  base  an  ethical  system  on
self-evident  moral  first  principles,  or  on  direct  intuitive  insight  into,  or rational
apprehension  of,  a  uniquely  moral  realm  of  truth.  Nor  do  they  think  it  possi-
ble  to  deduce  moral  first  principles  from  statements  of  fact,  making  no  chal-
lengeable  moral  assumptions  along  the  way.  On  the  other  hand,  these  writers
are not  willing to  deprive  general  principles  of their usual  role  in arguments  for
relatively specific  maxims  and judgments.  General  principles and  factual  premises
do  entail  specific  moral  judgments,  they  admit, but  the  most  suitable  general
principles, they insist, are  those  that summarize and are  supported  by the specific
moral judgments in which  we have the most confidence.  We  justify specific  moral
judgments,  on  their  view,  by  deriving  them  from  general  principles,  and  the
latter are  supported  in  turn  by a  demonstration  that the right  moral  judgments
(other moral  judgments)  follow from  them.  This  may  be  circular,  but it is  un-
avoidably  and  non-viciously  so.
*  if  there  is  no  common  ground  of  moral  conviction  whatever  between
two individuals  [who  are in  disagreement  over  a moral  question],  either  at the
level  of general principle  or the level of singular  judgment,  then the game  is  over
before  it  begins.  Logic  cannot  build  castles  on  air.  It  is  always  a  reasonable
assumption,  however,  that  two  individuals  in  ethical  disagreement  over  one
question  can  find  other matters  on  which they  are in solid  agreement.  In  order
for  one individual  to  "prove"  that the other  is  wrong  in  a given  belief  he must
use  those  beliefs  and  principles  of  the  other  party  which  he  himself  shares.  He
must show the other party that the belief he is  currently  defending is  inconsistent
with  one  of  his  own  principles,  or if  the subject  of  dispute  is  one  of the  other
party's  principles,  that it  would  commit  him  to  a  specific  judgment  which  he
would be embarrassed  to make. The  way to convince  another party  of the truth
of  a  general  moral  principle  is  to  show  him  that  it  summarizes  and  renders
coherent  his own  actual convictions better than  any  alternative  principle.
Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81  YAs.E L.J.  1004,  1019-20  (1972).CONSTITUTIONAL  WELFARE  RIGHTS
conclude  that  the  judiciary  now  should  frankly  take  up  the  theory
and  wield  it  in support  of  (or,  as  the  case  may be,  opposition  to)
various  welfare-rights  claims?  We  have  already  seen  that the  theory
itselfs  suggests  reasons  for  caution  in  approaching  this  question.
127
Imagine  a claim to  state provision  of  "decent"  housing, brought
on behalf  of a family including  children  of educable  age,  that plainly
has  no  other  presently  available  way  to  acquire  such  housing,  and
appealing  to  constitutional  texts  that are  at  best inconclusive  on  the
matter-say  those  guaranteeing  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  or pro-
tecting  life, liberty,  and  property  against  deprivation  attributable  to
the state, or obligating the state to furnish education.
2 8  Let us further
suppose  that the  judges  are  intuitively  drawn  to  recognition  of  the
claim. Their considered judgments tend to confirm it. They are, more-
over,  conversant  with  a body of  speculative  moral  theory  supporting
the  claim,  which  they  find persuasively  justified  by the  kind  of  co-
herence already described.  And all are further  agreed that the question
cannot  be  conclusively  resolved  by historical  research  into  what  the
framers had in mind when they drafted and adopted  the cited  consti-
tutional texts.
2 9
Nevertheless,  we  may  expect  to  find  the  judiciary  reluctant  to
determine  whether  the  claimed  right  to  adequate  housing  exists  and
is  to be enforced  if necessary  by judicial mandate.  The  court's  expla-
nation of its abstinence  is  likely to suggest not so  much denial of the
claimed  right  as  judicial  incompetence  to  answer  the  question,  or
inability  to  answer  it without violating  a felt  obligation  to  lay  aside
personal  "philosophy"  or  moral  convictions  in  dealing  with  legal
claims.  There is a rich and  distinguished judicial and  scholarly litera-
ture exploring  possible reasons  for self-restraint  of this sort.3 0  To  see
how the suggested "Rawlsian"  account of judicial review relates to this
literature, some  crude  restatement  of  some  of  the literature's  insights
is in order.
It is not immediately  clear what features  of our hypothetical  case
should excite special doubts on the judges' part about their competence,
in the most direct sense  of personal ability to perform the intellectual
operations, or to get at the information required to determine  the exis-
12
7  See text accompanying  notes  85-105  supra.
128 E.g., N.J.  CoNsT.  art. 8, § 4, guaranteeing  a  "thorough  and  efficient"  education
to  all.
129 Perhaps  not  many  would  argue  seriously  against  Professor  Karst's  statement
that, as  a  matter  of  actual  history, "[today  the  fourteenth  amendment  embodies much
of  what  has become  our  natural-law  Constitution."  Karst,  Not  One Law  at Rome  and
Another at Athens:  The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972  WAsH.
U.L.Q.  383.  See  Frank  & Munro,  The  Original Understanding of  "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 1972  WAsH.  U.L.Q.  421, 476;  cf.  A. BIcxm,  supra note  94,  at  108-10.
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tence  or violation  of the claimed  right. The issue's resolution  is likely
to depend  on a number of factors that are as accessible  to judges as to
legislators,  most if not all of which are of a sort that in other contexts
has  often been regarded  as well within-if not peculiarly within-the
judicial province:  a parsing of constitutional texts, tradition, or accepted
principles of justice;  or a correct reading of prevailing social standards
and  sentiments.  Even the perplexing  questions  of  economic  feasibility
which may be relevant-for example, whether there is some way to ful-
fill the claimed housing right without  leaving the bottom worse  off,  on
the whole, than it now is-do not seem different in essence  from other
issues that courts have deemed  judicially triable, such as the economic
issues in a major  industrial nuisance  litigation.
More plausible is the notion of remedial incompetence-the notion
that judicial officers have no way of actually  enforcing a determination
in  favor  of  a  right to  adequate  housing,  because  fulfilling  it  entails
actions  (e.g.;  raising and appropriating  public  funds  and creating new
administrative  structures)  that are  immediately  controlled  by the  ex-
ecutive  and legislative  branches,  and involves  a complex  of subsidiary
but vitally  important  choices  which  the  judiciary  lacks  all  basis  for
making. But this notion by itself fails to distinguish our welfare-rights
case clearly from cases involving  school desegregation'31  and finance,1 32
and  legislative  reapportionment.'  In  such  cases  courts  have  been
willing to  try remedial  devices  designed  to  harness  to  the  court's  an-
nounced  principle  the  competence  and  accountability  of  nonjudicial
public  officials-most  typically,  a judicial mandate  to  legislative,  ex-
ecutive,  or administrative  officers  to prepare, submit, and carry  out a
corrective  plan.  Indeed the  prognosis  for  one  or another  of  these  ap-
proaches  would  seem  good,  assuming  a  modicurh  of  willingness  to
comply on the part of these nonjudicial  officials. The notion of remedial
incompetence  seems  to be at bottom  a concern  that  the  disposition to
comply in our welfare-rights  case will be less than in the reapportion-
ment,  segregation,  and  school-finance  cases-and  less  than  in  the
generality  of  cases  in  which  governmental  bodies  are  subjected  to
specific  and  declaratory  remedies,  not  to  mention  simple  awards  of
money damages.  If this concern  over  compliance  does  not quite  con-
V' E.g., Bradley  v.  Milliken,  468  F.2d  902  (6th  Cir.),  cert.  denied, 409  U.S.  844
(1972).  But  see Bradley  v. School  Board,  462  F.2d  1058  (4th  Cir. 1972).
132E.g., Van  Dusartz  v.  Hatfield,  334  F.  Supp.  870  (D.  Minn.  1971);  Serrano  v.
Priest,  5  Cal. 3d  584, 487  P.2d 1241,  96  Cal. Rptr.  601  (1971);  cf. Robinson v.  Cahill,  62
N.J.  473,  303  A.2d 273,  additional opinion, 63  N.J.  196,  306  A.2d  65  (1973).  The decision
of the Supreme  Court  in San Antonio  Independent  School Dist. v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1
(1973),  while  reaching  a  conclusion  on the merits  contrary  to those  in  Serrano and Van
Dusartz, did not purport to base that conclusion  on any notion of  remedial incompetence.
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tradict  our  supposition  (and  the  predictable  protestations  of  the
judges) 134  that they find the shelter claim intuitively  appealing, it can
be only because the judges at the same time doubt their ability to make
it seem  so  clearly  appealing  to  others.  But  why  would  judges  who
themselves  are  convinced  by  the  moral  philosopher's  arguments  be
unable  to persuade others in turn?
A  more  powerful  and  sophisticated  version  of  the  remedial  in-
competence  notion would  emphasize  the  amoebalike  quality  of  bud-
getary  and redistributive  politics.  If  judicially  forced  to  respond  to
this  claim  on  behalf  of  the  poor,  the  political  dynamic  might  re-
establish  its  equilibrium  by  forsaking  some  other  existing  program
oriented  towards  their  needs.1 3 5  But  if  the  underlying  moral  theory
suggests  a broad spectrum  of judicial protection  against such possibil-
ities, 3 6  then  everything  once  again  seems  to  turn  on  how  confident
the judges  are that the theory  can  be wielded persuasively  enough to
induce  compliance  on  all  relevant  fronts.
So we  reach  another  interpretation  of  the  incompetence  notion:
that  the  court  lacks  modes  of  articulation  and  explanation  under
which it can decide the case and maintain  its appearance  of answering
to external principle,  the  moral source  of  its influence  on  other parts
of government.  Recognition  of  the claimed  right  to adequate  housing
or  of  its violation  might  depend  on  factors  which,  although  no  less
appraisable  by judges than  by legislators,  or by adjudicatory  than by
legislative  process,  might  nevertheless  seem  too  vague,  too  ineffable,
or too debatable  to  furnish an  acceptable  basis  for judicial  action. A
judicial  judgment  on  the  matter  might  seem  dictatorial,  whereas  a
parallel  legislative  judgment  never  could,  given  its  representative
inputs  and  likely  adverse  impact  on  the  narrow  self-interest  of  the
majority.
We have been assuming throughout this  discussion that the shelter
claim is intuitively appealing  to the judges,  and  perceived  by them as
coherent  with  a speculative  theory  which itself  coheres  with a much
broader  range  of evident  societal ideals  and  practices.  In light  of this
assumption,  every  reason  we  have been  able  to give  for  judicial  ab-
stinence  seems at first glance troublesome.  We seem  to be saying that
a  decision  which,  once  truly  understood,  would  not  popularly  and
genuinely  be  felt to be  repugnant  on  its  merits,  may  nevertheless  be
unacceptable  because  it is  destined  not  be understood.
134 Cf.  San Antonio  Independent  School Dist.  v. Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1  (1973).
135 See,  e.g.,  Carrington,  On  Egalitarian Overzeal:  A  Polemic  Against  the  Local
School Property Tax Cases, 1972  U.  hL.L.F. 232,  253-54.
1 36 See text  accompanying  notes  72-80  supra.
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How  does  this  concern  for  the  understandability  of  judicial  de-
cisions fit with our suggestion for a Rawlsian account  of the institution
of judicial  review? 3'  In that  account, judicial  review  seemed  to  pre-
suppose the  following:
1.  Given the society's evolutionary  circumstances,  there is  a
likelihood  that  even a  representative,  majoritarian  legis-
lature will  sometimes act  (or  fail  to act)  in ways  which
violate  principles  of  justice.
2.  On  a  significant  number  of  occasions,  these  violations
will  be  such  that  they can  be  convincingly  enough  dem-
onstrated  by  judges  to  induce  willing  rectification,  al-
though they are  not so immediately  visible and repugnant
as to prevent them from occurring in the first place.
3.  When  violations  are  judicially  demonstrated-or  when
they are determined  within  a course  of judicial interven-
tions which  on the  whole  succeeds  in demonstrating  the
violations  which  it  determines-the  political  branches
will  comply  with  corrective  judicial  mandates.
Given  Rawlsian  premises,  acceptance  of  judicial  review  thus  reflects
a  belief  that it is  possible  and  useful  to  cultivate  a  special  capacity
for  evaluating  the  compliance  of  legislative  action  (inaction)  with
principles  of justice  or  their  derived  constitutional  embodiments,  and
for  persuading the  generality of  citizens  to  recognize  discrepancies
when they occur.
Now  our  discussion  of  judicial  abstinence  from  welfare-rights
claims has supposed that judges may approve  a claim as in accordance
with  moral  theory  coherently  expressing  popular  morality,  and  yet
be  incapable  of performing  the  overt intellectual  movements  required
for valid  judicial review  (sometimes  called  "reasoned  elaboration"  of,
or  "reasoned  argument"  from,  accepted  premises).  If  one  believes,
as  we  have  just  posited,  that  courts  are  sometimes  capable  of  rec-
ognizing  discrepancies  and  convincing  the  public  of  their  existence,
it is unclear  how  a court which privately  acknowledged  the  coherence
of a claimed  right with  public  morality would be  incapable  of demon-
strating that coherence  through  reasoned  argument-unless  "reasoned
argument,"  perhaps  surprisingly,  means  something  different  from
effective persuasion. The  question we must  face,  then, is why we  tend
to  restrict  the  allowable  mode  of  judicial  persuasion  to  "reasoned
argument"  in  some  narrow  sense  of  simple  chains  of  reasoning  from
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initially  established premises  or  data.  Why  do we  not  embrace  other
potentially effective modes of persuasive  discourse,  such as the patient,
roundabout,  indeed  circular,  style  of  justification  by  coherence,  of
which Rawls  is  such  a notable  exemplar?
The answer, not so  mysteriously  after  all, lies in the  intellectual
complexity that seems bound to attend  efforts to justify moral theories,
and to  derive  specific  rights from  them by coherence-style  argument.
The difficulty is perhaps adequately suggested by the first two parts of
this  essay. We  did not there undertake  to  review  the  many intercon-
necting  strands  of  the  fabric  of  arguments  justifying  the  theory  of
justice as fairness. Yet we did catch a glimpse of the kind of intellectual
effort demanded of one who would draw welfare  rights out of a theory
so  formulated  that  it  can  plausibly  claim  justification  through  the
coherence it lends  to the considered  moral judgments  of contemporary
representative  social  critics.  Even  assuming  that the  coherence-justi-
fication  of  the theory,  and  the  derivation  of  welfare  rights  from the
theory, could in principle be made ultimately compelling to the genera-
lity of citizens, the  possibility remains  that the  intellectual  journey is
too difficult and tortured to fit the Rawlsian account of judicial review.
The intrinsic values ascribed by justice as fairness  to equal participa-
tory rights, and their connection with the preeminent social good of self-
respect, 138 seem to indicate that Rawls contemplates  fairly strict limits
on the intellectual  capacities  and  exertions  that may be demanded  of
citizens  as  the  condition  of  their  being  satisfied  that  controversial
judicial mandates  are  indeed  correct-limits  perhaps  strict  enough to
rule out judicial vindication of certain substantive rights which, Rawls
also teaches, would be honored in a good society.
Here, then, is the nub:  certain societies  may have reached a stage
of  development  in which  shared  or overlapping  senses  of  justice  are
implicit or emergent among the generality of citizens, but not fully and
explicitly acknowledged by most of them except, perhaps, in their rarest
moments  of  maximum  lucidity  and  detachment.  Such  societies  are
potentially but not actually in  a well-ordered  condition in which  their
affairs are effectively regulated by shared principles  of justice. It  seems
that societies  lying  within  this  evolutionary  range  have  the  clearest
uses  for  judicial review  that  appeals  directly  to  principles  of justice.
But it also seems that the further such a society is from the actuality  of
a well-ordered  condition-the  more  primitively  developed  is its  com-
mon  sense  of justice-the greater  will be both  that society's  need for
such  judicial review  and  the  difficulty its judges  will  have  in holding
13
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to  a  tolerable  level  the  associated  costs  in participatory  inequality
which  damages self-respect.
Thus it seems to be the terms of the  trade-off between  justice  in
participatory  rights  and  justice  in  substantive  rights  that  would  ac-
count,  in  a  Rawlsian  view,  for  the position  that  rights  can  be  re-
cognized  only  through judicial  reasoning  which  proceeds  simply  from
previously  established  premises,  or, in  cases  in which  such  reasoning
proves  fruitless,  through  a  new  expression  of  political  consensus
(through formalities of amending the constitution).  On this interpreta-
tion,  contemporary  differences  of view regarding the question  of judi-
cial "activism,"  and secular swings of general  opinion on that question,
could be said to reflect  differences  or shifts in the relative  weights  ac-
corded participatory  equality and substantive  rights,  or differences  in
perceptions  about where  our society stands  along the range of  poten-
tially  (but not  actually)  well-ordered  ones.
B.  Moral Theory as a Backdrop for Positive Entitlements:
The  Question of Judicial Activism
Now judgments made within the foregoing  frame of thought  may
tell us that courts should not cut welfare rights  out of the whole cloth
of  speculative  moral  theory-not  Rawls'  theory,  at  any  rate-and
foist them on resistant legislatures.  But such judgments do not exhaust
the question of whether judges should ever allow such a moral theory to
become  a guiding  influence,  or an  acknowledged  one,  in adjudication.
There  remain  to be  considered  the  inescapable  judicial  functions  of
construing constitutional  and statutory materials whose significance  for
a given dispute is debatable, and of determining the correct application
to such materials of due process and equal protection guaranties in their
formal  and non-substantive  aspects.  Perhaps  a theory like  Rawls'  can
impart meaning and direction to judicial  events occurring in the wake
of constitutional  or legislative initiatives that arise, so far as the theory
is concerned,  quite spontaneously.
For  one  thing, the theory  may help us  see that constitutional  or
statutory  establishment  of  insurance  rights139  may  be  understood  as
fulfilling  claims  of justice  and right. Insurance rights might  otherwise
be viewed  as mere  responses  to external  economies  of  consumption-
that is, provision of goods and opportunities might be justified solely by
a perception that one person's enjoyment of those goods and  opportuni-
139 The  only  such  rights  commonly  encountered  in  extant  American  constitutions
pertain  to  education.  For  an  example  of  a  constitutionally  protected  right  to  education,
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ties  has  consequences  that are  beneficial  for  others.140  The  external-
economies  explanation  seems  particularly  well-suited  for a scheme  of
public provision of certain goods that uses a plan of general  provision
rather than a needs test,'  inasmuch  as  (1)  any claims of justice  and
rights might seem more naturally met by general monetary transfers,'
14 2
and  (2)  the plan  provides  for persons  who  would  not suffer involun-
tary  deprivation  in  its  absence-a  gratuity  most  obviously  explain-
able  as  a libertarian
143  response  to  a perception  that without  public
subsidy each individual would allocate less private income to the good
in question than would be socially optimal.
Our  suggested  account  of  constitutional  welfare  rights may help
us  resist  the  external-economies  explanation.  It  offers  reasons  why
social-minimum  claims (i.e.,  claims of justice and right)  might give rise
to constitutionally protected insurance  rights.'44  It  further helps us see
that legislation creating such rights may be regarded as justice-inspired
supplementation  of  the  constitutional  catalogue  (if  there  is  any)  of
surrogates  for the social minimum-as  legislative  recognition of items
omitted  from  the  constitution,  perhaps  because  the  then-prevailing
evolutionary  circumstances  did not  urgently  suggest  them  (e.g.,  the
country was not so wealthy then, or so oriented to technology  and edu-
cational credentials,  or so committed to litigation as a way of resolving
1
40 The benefit may  consist  of allaying  external  diseconomies,  and those  diseconomies
might  be  moral  as  well  as  material.  The  members  of  society  might  be  humanitarians,
made  uncomfortable  by  awareness  that other  persons  are  experiencing  certain  kinds  of
deprivations.  See  Musgrave,  The  Role  of  Social  Insurance in  an  Overall Program for
Social Welfare,  in  Tan  PamcEox  Syn,'osrux:  ox  TH  Aaru_.  Sysr  oF  SocIAL
INSURANCE  23,  25  (W.  Bowen  ed.  1968).  A  speculative  theory  of  justice  might  help  us
account  for  these  feelings.  Insofar  as it  does,  a purpose  of  dealing  with  "moral"  external
economies  of consumption  will tend  to merge  with a  purpose  of  doing  justice.
141Under  a  "needs  test"  plan, public  provision  for  the  specified  want  is  made  only
insofar  as the  person in want  cannot  afford to  satisfy it  out of  private income.  Under  a
"general  provision"  plan,  provision  is  made  for  whoever  has  occasion  to  accept  it,  re-
gardless  of  his  private  income.  Public  housing  and  public  education,  as  commonly  ad-
ministered  at  present,  illustrate  the  two  plans  respectively.
142 General  monetary  transfers  are  more  respectful  of  the  liberty  of  the  recipient,
allowing  him  to  define  his  own  needs.  With  regard  to  certain,  rather  narrowly  limited,
goods  and  circumstances,  the  notion  of  "paternalism"  may  provide  an  alternative  ra-
tionale  for  the  transformation  of  social-minimum  claims  into  insurance  rights.  As  Rawls
puts  it, this  notion  reflects  the  fact  that persons  in  the  original  position
will want  to  insure  themselves  against  the  possibility  that  their  powers  are un-
developed  and they  cannot  rationally  advance  their  interests,  as  in  the  case  of
children;  or that through  some  misfortune  or  accident  they  are unable  to make
decisions  for  their  good,  as  in  the  case  of  those  seriously  injured  or  mentally
disturbed.
*.  . [Pjaternalistic  intervention  must  be  justified  by  the  evident  failure  or
absence  of reason  and will  . . . and  [paternalistic  principles]  must not be inter-
preted  to license assaults on one's convictions  and character by any means  so long
as these  offer  the  prospect  of securing  consent later  on.
RAwLs  248-50.
148 "Libertarian"  because  the  method  chosen  is  to  subsidize,  not  compel,  additional
consumption.
144 See  text accompanying  notes  121-23  supra.
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a wide range of controversies).  Should the legislature become convinced
that good  G,  in addition to  any others  mentioned  in the  constitution,
must be covered by a just social minimum whose other components and
upper limits  remain unspecifiable,  a new insurance right seems  an ap-
propriate  response,  with or  without a needs  test.145  Moreover,  the ac-
count suggests a special reason why such justice-inspired  welfare  rights
might be guaranteed to everyone regardless of need. This approach may
contribute  to  the workability  of the  legislative  system  by relieving  it
from the baffling task of precisely identifying  and  costing all items in
the  catalogue  of  surrogates  before  providing  for  those  which  it  has
been able to identify.4
Now one  may fairly ask  why it is  at all  important  whether  a
constitutional guaranty or legislative program is to be taken as impelled
exclusively  by considerations  of  efficiency  and  external  economies,  or
rather  (at least  in part)  by considerations  of justice  and  rights.  Are
these inferential  understandings likely to have any effect on legislative
and judicial behavior?  A legislature's  failure to  implement a constitu-
tional guaranty understood  to be for the benefit  of the general  public
which it directly  represents  is  more  easily excused-or  at least  over-
145 One  possible  objection  to  dispensing  with  a  needs  test  and  using  a  general-
provision  plan  (when  the  program's  purpose  supposedly  is  to  satisfy  claims  of  justice
and  right rather  than  realize  external  economies  of  consumption)  might  be  that  a  gen-
eral-provision  plan,  by  shielding all  beneficiaries  of  the publicly  financed  operation  from
having  to  pay  specifically  for  benefits  received  (through  fees,  user  charges,  or  special
assessments),  unnecessarily  impairs  the  combined  effectiveness  of  the  pricing  and  voting
processes  in  reaching  an  efficient  allocation  of  resources  through  the  public  fisc.  See  R.
MUSORAVE,  Taa  THEORY  OF PUBmc FinAwCE  116-35  (1959);  and  compare  Rawis'  dis-
cussion  of  the  "exchange  branch"  at  RAWLs  282-84.  Put  a  little  differently,  the  thought
would  be  that,  as  to  all  persons  who  can  easily  afford  to  pay  full  costs  out  of  private
income,  provision  of  a  particular  good  or  service  "free"-ie.,  financing  its  cost  out  of
general  revenues-can  only  be  justified  by,  and  so  must  imply,  a  judgment  that  the
good  or  service  is  best  regarded  as  a  "public  good,"  for  example  because  consumption
of  it  radiates  indivisible  external  economies.  But  this  seems  hypertechnical.  Consistent
with  a  view  of  the  good  or  service  in  question  as  a  welfare  right  would  be  a  sup-
position  that  just about  everyone  who  can  afford  to  pay  for  it  out  of  private  income
would  choose  to  do  so  were  it not  publicly  provided.  Cf.  Michelman,  supra note  17,  at
30.  Moreover,  as  previously  discussed  in  the  text,  the  cost  of  the  entire  welfare-rights
package  is  likely  to  be  smaller  than  the  appropriate  minimum  guaranteed  income  level.
Therefore,  any  provision  out  of  general  revenues  of  specified  goods  and  services  can  be
taken  into  account,  and  distributionally  neutralized,  in  public  deliberations  over,  say,
the  proper  rate  configuration  (including  negative  rates)  of  the income  tax.
146 Under  the  needs-test  approach,  a  person  is  guaranteed  a  good  or  service  insofar
as he  needs it and  cannot  afford  it. We  have  to  consider,  though,  what  is meant  by  the
statement  that a  person  "cannot  afford"  something. What  we  usually  mean,  I  think,  is
that  even  if  he  had  the  means  immediately  available  to  pay  for  what  he  needs,  the
result would  be to force his consumption  of some other  good or service  below  some stated
or assumed  level.  In  terms  of  the  present  discussion,  we  could  say that  a person  cannot
"afford"  the  cost  of  satisfying  a  given  need  if paying  it  would  disable  him  from  satis-
fying  other  needs  in  the  welfare-rights  catalogue  of  surrogates  for  the  just  social  mini-
mum.  Thus  a  needs-test  approach  entails  the  baffling  task  mentioned  in  the  text.  A
general-provision  approach  may  alleviate  the  problem,  but will  not  entirely  avoid  it.
The  legislature  will  still  need  to  consider  whether  provision  for  the  watt  in  question
is  likely  to have  economic  ramifications  that will  rule  out  provision  for  other  wants  on
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looked-than its failure to accord persons their rightful  claims against
that  represented  public.  Thus  a  convincing  claim  of  justice-inspired
right  may  lend  a special  force  to  legislative  advocacy.  And  it  may
undergird  judicial  boldness  and  inventiveness  in  exploiting  openings
and opportunities  spontaneously  provided by the legislature:  although
a constitutional  guaranty of, say, a "thorough  and  efficient  education"
may not be deemed one  which the  court  can  enforce  from  scratch-
whether because it entails the appropriation  of funds  and design of ad-
ministrative  structures,  or because  the standards  of  thoroughness and
efficiency are not justiciable' 7-- the court may yet find ways  of build-
ing  on legislative  foundations,  ways  not  necessarily  contemplated  or
welcomed by the legislature. And the same may be true where the wel-
fare right which the legislature has spontaneously begun to honor  can-
not be connected with any specific constitutional  text.
The last point deserves  some expansion.  It  suggests  further study
of  the  interplay  between  the  legislative/administrative  and  judicial
branches  in the process  of revealing  and realizing welfare  rights. Can
it be said that there are  some  claims  which,  originating  in legislative
actions which  could not have been judicially  compelled,  are thereupon
accorded  unusually assertive  judicial support?148 And that the princi-
ples on which these claims are picked out bear logically  expressible  re-
lationships to principles of justice or  rights generated by intellectually
coherent  philosophical  theories?  If  so, a legislature  which might  law-
fully  have  remained  quiescent  would  find,  once  having  adopted  a
limited  and  qualified  program  for  meeting  needs  favored  by  such
theories, that the limitations and qualifications  would be  placed under
severe strain by the judiciary. At the extreme, the courts might prevent
repeal of the program.'49  Less  drastically, the  courts  might invalidate
147 But see  Robinson  v.  Cahill,  118  N.J.  Super.  223,  287  A.2d  187,  supplemented,
119  N.J. Super. 40,  289  A.2d  569  (1972),  modified, 62  N.J.  473,  303  A.2d  273,  additional
opinion, 63  N.J.  196,  306  A.2d  65  (1973)  (state  system  in  which  districts  operated  on
varying  per-pupil  expenditures,  and  some  districts  were  markedly  ill-equipped  and  in-
effective,  held  unconstitutional  under  "thorough  and  efficient"  requirement).
148 Consider  the  notion  of  "fundamental  interests"  capable  of  triggering  "strict
review"  in  the  two-tiered  equal protection  paradigm  of  recent  glory.  See,  e.g.,  Michel-
man, supra  note  17,  at 22-23.
The  utility and  future  prospects  of the  two-tier  approach  have  recently  been  ques-
tioned  by  Gunther,  The Supreme  Court, 1971  Term-Foreword: In  Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a  Changing Court: A  Model for a  Newer Equal Protection, 86  HARv.  L.
Rv. 1,  8-20  (1972).  But  see  the  Supreme  Court's  even  more  recent  confirmation  of  the
method  in  San Antonio  Independent  School  Dist. v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1  (1973).
149 Consider  Reitman  v.  Mulkey,  387  U.S.  369  (1967),  one  of  the  famously
problematic  decisions  of  recent  years.  Does  it  not  suggest  an  affirmative  duty  on  the
state's  part  to  enact  an  antidiscrimination  law-a  duty  whose  initial  performance
the  Court  could  not  compel  because  it  had  no  way  of  settling  questions  involving  the
proper  locus  of  enforcement  responsibility,  administrative  procedure,  nature  and
gravity  of  sanctions,  marginal  applications,  and  so  forth?  The  enacted  statute  reflected
the  legislature's  preferences-or  at least  one-time  preferences-concerning  these  matters.
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statutory  eligibility  conditions;' 50  strictly  construe  delegations  of
authority  to  administrative  officers  to  fashion  such  conditions; 15'  im-
pose exacting standards of procedural nicety in processing admission to
and exclusion from  assistance; 5 2  invalidate  seemingly plausible classi-
fications  among  potential  eligibles; 53  or  create  seemingly  inflexible
requirements  of  equal  expenditure  for  all  program  beneficiaries,  per-
haps as a device for ensuring that at least the minimum acceptable level
of service will be attained  for all.'54  The whole process  may  be inter-
preted  as the judiciary's  seizing  upon  a legislative  initiative  which it
could not, within  separation-of-powers  constraints,  have  compelled  in
spite  of  felt  claims  of  right,  for the  purpose  of  thenceforth  securing
and  expanding  the  fulfillment  of  such  claims.  Viewed  from  a  more
global  and  detached  perspective,  the process  may  be regarded  as  one
of  mutually  reinforcing  interaction  between  the  two  branches,  built
into the constitution by the  framers in the interest of justice.
Outright  repeal  (or,  in  this  case,  constitutional-amendment  override)  reflects  no  dis-
satisfaction  with  these  adjective  or  finely  balanced  features  of  the  law,  but  rather  a
broadly  unconstitutional  purpose  (as  we  are  now  supposing)  of  withdrawing  protection
owed.  In  blocking  repeal,  the  Court  did  not  have  to  take  on  the  uneasy  task  of  re-
viewing  legislative  detail  work  and  fine  tuning  (as  would  have  been  necessary  under
a  decree  purporting  to  require  initial  enactment)  or  jeopardize  its  authority  by  in-
viting  an intransigent  legislature  to  answer  a  decree  with  inaction.  (Even  a  subsequent
legislative refusal  to appropriate  funds to  pay for enforcement  could  not prevent effectua-
tion  of  the  Court's  will  through  private  civil  litigation.)  See  generally Karst  & Horo-
witz,  Reitman  v.  Mulkey:  A  Telophase of  Substantive Equal Protection, 1967  S.  CT.
REv.  39.
15
0 See  Smith  v.  King,  277  F.  Supp.  31  (M.D.  Ala.  1967)  (Alabama's  "substitute
father"  ("man-in-the-house")  rule,  as  applied  to  federally-assisted  AFDC  programs,
denies  equal protection),  aff'd, 392  U.S.  309  (1968)  (Alabama  rule  is  invalid  on  grounds
of  conflict  with  federal  statute);  id. at  334  (Douglas,  J.,  concurring)  (Alabama  rule
denies  equal  protection);  ef. Potts  v. Breen,  167  Ill.  67,  47  N.E.  81  (1897)  (state  board
of  health  not  authorized  by  statute  to  require  vaccination  as  condition  of  school  at-
tendance;  query  whether  statutory  authorization  would  be  valid  in  light  of  state  con-
stitution's  guaranty  of  "a  good  common  school  education").
151See  Alexander  v. Thompson,  313  F.  Supp.  1389  (C.D.  Cal.  1970)  (state  statute
empowering  local  school  board  to  "prescribe  rules  ...  for  the  government  and  dis-
cipline  of  the  schools"  would  be  unconstitutional  delegation  if  construed  to  authorize
grooming  regulations  leading  to  exclusion  from  school);  Potts  v.  Breen,  167  Ill.  67,  47
N.E.  81  (1897).
152See  Goldberg  v.  Kelly,  397 U.S.  254  (1970)  (due-process  hearing  required  prior
to  terminating  welfare  payments  on  grounds  of  recipient's  noneligibility);  Holmes  v.
New  York City  Housing Auth.,  398 F.2d  262  (2d  Cir.  1968)  (N.Y.C. Housing Authority,
receiving  90,000  applications  and  admitting  10,000  families  annually,  may  violate  due
process  by  not  processing  applications  chronologically  or  in  accordance  with  published
standards,  or  by  lot,  "or  in  any  other  reasonable  and  systematic  manner,"  by  not  noti-
fying  applicants  of  their  status  and  by  not disclosing  reasons  for  rejecting applications).
1
5 3 See  Thomas  v. Housing  Auth.,  282  F. Supp.  575  (E.D.  Ark.  1967)  (defendant's
regulation  excluding unwed  mothers  not  authorized  by  statutory  delegation  of  power to
make  needful  regulations  consistent  with  public  housing  statutes,  even  though  pur-
pose  was  to  avoid  objectionable  behavior  in  project;  regulation  is  rigid  and  overbroad
and "does  not square  with the humane  purpose  of  the low rent  housing program,"  id. at
581);  cf.  Shapiro  v. Thompson,  394  U.S.  618  (1969)  (requirement  of  a year's  residence
in  state,  as  condition  of  eligibility  for  public  assistance,  unconstitutionally  burdens  right
of  interstate  travel).  But see  Dandridge  v.  Williams,  397  U.S.  471  (1970),  rev'g 297  F.
Supp.  450  (D.  Md.  1969).
154 See Serrano  v. Priest,  5 Cal.  3d  584,  487  P.2d  1241,  96  Cal.  Rptr.  601  (1971).
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This interpretation  supposes  (adopting  once  again  for  a moment
the judiciary's  perspective  rather  than the  more  global  one)  that the
same legislature which  could not be compelled in the first place  to in-
augurate  a welfare-rights program  can nevertheless  be led by judicial
pressure  and  authority  to  deepen  and  expand  such  a  program  once
adopted, without prohibitive risk that the obvious alternative of legisla-
tive withdrawal will occur. A part of the hypothesis, then, is that courts
make judgments  (call them tactical judgments, if you like) about these
likelihoods;  and that  these  judgments  will  prove  to  reflect  accurate
judicial intuitions or perceptions  of the degree to which the legislative
initiative can be seen as responding to claims of natural rights-that is,
as  consisting with  an  emergent public  sense  of  justice  expressible  by
principles  in  a  coherent  theory  of  justice.  If  the  hypothesis  to  this
extent  seems appealing, then further  steps may be suggested:  that as
judges  go  about  their business  of selectively  translating constitutional
and statutory offerings into welfare rights-as they play their role in the
authorship  of  positive  entitlements-they  should  conscientiously  try
to clarify in their own minds some systematic moral theory which justi-
fies and accounts for their decisions, should not shrink from incorporat-
ing  such  thought  in  their  public  explanations  of  what  they  do,  and
should be prepared at an appropriate stage in the emergence  of a wel-
fare right to declare that such a right exists. Such judicial behavior  at
any rate would seem to accord with our suggested Rawlsian account of
welfare  rights and judicial  review under  nonideal  conditions.15 5
C.  Moral Theory and Neutral Principles
All  of this may have some bearing on the problem of neutrality of
principle in constitutional adjudication.'"  One tries to understand vari-
ous legal claims and entitlements in a certain way-that is, as reflecting
"natural rights" which in turn are suggested by principles  of justice  in
a  coherent  theory  of  justice.  Then  neither  rights  nor  principles  can
stand in isolation  from any other  rights or principles  contained  in or
suggested by the same theory. A right is valid only for cases to which it
properly  applies  under  the  theory  which  supports  it;  every  right  is
bounded by other rights, every principle must connect with other prin-
ciples.  A  right  too  far  distended  is  injustice.  As  Professor  Deutsch,
following  Ernest  Brown,  correctly  insists,  there  can be  no  ultimate,
155 See  text accompanying  notes  109-21  supra.
150 For discussion  of  neutrality  in  constitutional  adjudication,  see  A.  BIcx.EL,  supra
note  94, at  49-65;  H.  WECESrER,  Toward Neutral Principles of  Constitutional Law, in
PRICmiPLEs,  PoLiTIs, AND  FuNDAmTAL  LAW  3  (1961);  Deutsch,  Neutrality, Legitimacy,
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law  and Political  Science, 20  STxas.
L. REV.  169,  178-97  (1968).
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total  "neutrality"  in  the application  of principles  to cases,  unless  the
principles  used  all  belong  to  one  family  of  revealed  principles  whose
members  are  exhaustively  interlaced  across  the  whole  universe-or
at  least  a  sizeable  and  somewhat  self-contained  region-of  social
problems.'
7
Suppose  a statutory public-housing  program  is  administered  in  a
way that promotes or supports a demeaning, stigmatizing kind of racial
segregation;  and  that judicial proscription  of that method  of admini-
stration seems most likely to result not in correction  but in termination
of the program. Constitutional  texts provide  no unambiguous guidance,
and the problem at first glance seems to have no obviously satisfactory
solution."5 8 A judge imbued  with  Rawls'  theory does at least have  re-
course to a principled way of organizing and directing the search for an
answer. The judge may consider that the housing program is  reflective
of  moral  entitlements,  and  may  further  consider  that  the  existing
method  of  administration  seems severely  damaging  to the  goal  of ad-
vancing  self-respect  deemed  centrally  important  in  the  same  moral
theory that suggests the moral-entitlement interpretation of the housing
program. Thus the case seems  to pit a welfare-rights  principle against
a self-respect principle. The virtue of the moral theory, insofar as it is
found persuasive, lies in its suggestion  that welfare rights ideally work
in the service of self-respect. 5 9 There may  be reason to believe,  in the
existing  non-ideal  situation  in  which  the  principles  are  in  immediate
conflict,  that short-term  subordination  of  self-respect  to  welfare  will
yield a long-term strengthening  of self-respect.  If not, the welfare pro-
gram must lose out-that is, the court must insist on its being adminis-
tered in a way that predictably  will  lead to its demise.  Whatever  the
conclusion,  it will seem  more bearable  if the  court  can give a neutral
explanation  for it-one which both has some persuasive  force and will
not be embarrassing in future  cases.  A comprehensive,  coherent theory
of social justice, such as Rawls has attempted,  holds out the hope that
such explanations  can be given. The  theory,  as  Rawls  would  have it,
serves as
a guiding framework  designed to focus our moral sensibilities
and  to put before  our  intuitive  capacities  more  limited  and
manageable  questions  for judgment  ....  If  the scheme  as  a
whole seems  on reflection  to clarify  and order  our thoughts,
and if it tends to reduce disagreements  and to bring divergent
157Deutsch,  supra note  156,  at  187-90;  Brown,  Book  Review,  62  CoLum.  L.  REv.
386  (1962).
158 See, e.g.,  Note,  Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux  v.  Chicago  Hous-
ing  Authority,  79  YAL  L...  712  (1970).
1
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convictions  more in  line,  then it has  done  all  that  one may
reasonably ask.' 0 0
Professor Deutsch seems satisfied that there can be no comprehen-
sive  moral  theory  capable  of  imbuing  judicial  handiwork,  extended
over  time  and  subject  matter,  with  such neutrality  as  we have  been
considering. He may be right;  but it is important to see just what his
denial means. A work like Rawls'  suggests that such a theory is not a
logical or verbal impossibility. More  study is needed, but it would not
amaze me if Rawls'  theory does turn out to be worthily comprehensive
and coherent-that  it does  offer  reasons,  both general  and  somewhat
persuasive,  that help  organize  the search  for  answers  across  a broad
spectrum of testing cases.
If so, then  Professor  Deutsch's denial  must  refer  not  to natural
limitations  on the achievable  scope,  refinement,  or internal  coherence
of  possible  theories  of social  justice, but to  the  illegitimacy  of  trans-
forming any such theory into law-of  certifying it for  deployment by
judges. That, of  course, is no trivial problem. But its ultimate  signifi-
cance must be judged in light of  three interrelated  features  of  Rawls'
theory. First, the theory, while coherent  and comprehensive,  is at the
same  time "loose."  It consists  of  broad  principles  which  derive  their
meaning  not  from verbal  precision but  from  the  rich cumulation  of
persuasions-some scientific, some traditional, some intuitive-in which
they are  embedded.  There  is  no  possibility  that the  theory  could  be
applied in any automatic way, or be transformed  into a code susceptible
of automatic application. Second, popular decision processes are strongly
valued by the theory.'6'  There is no possibility that judges imbued with
it could ever lose sight of the "counter-majoritarian  difficulty."' ' 62 Third,
the theory seeks ultimate justification by its claimed coherence with the
latent morality of the people. And this gets us back to Professor Deutsch
who, despairing  of  ultimate  neutrality through  an exhaustive  and  co-
herent system of principles  of justice,  suggests instead that a principle
is applied neutrally if it is applied harmoniously with popular  will and
understanding.13  Rawls'  effort suggests the  possibility that Deutsch's
two interpretations  of neutrality-the  totally  objective view which he
finds  impossible  and  the  qualified,  public-acceptance  view  which  he
espouses-may in the end be made convergent.
The  vehicle  of  convergence  would  be  something  akin to the  re-
flective  equilibration  which  lies  at  the  core  of  Rawlsian  moral  argu-
160 RAWL  53.
161 See  text  accompanying  notes  101-05  supra.
1
62  A.  BicKEL,  supra note  94, at  16-23.
163 See  Deutsch,  supra note  156,  at  192-97.
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ment.  "Reflective  equilibrium"  perhaps  offers  a paradigm  of  judicial
review:
In describing  our sense of justice an allowance must be made
for  the  likelihood  that  considered  judgments  are  no  doubt
subject  to  certain  irregularities  and  distortions  despite  the
fact  that they  are  rendered  under  favorable  circumstances.
When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing  ac-
count of his  sense of justice  (one,  say, which  embodies vari-
ous reasonable and natural presumptions),  he may well revise
his judgments  to  conform  to  its  principles  even  though  the
theory  does not fit his  existing judgments  exactly. He  is  es-
pecially  likely to  do  this  if he  can  find  an  explanation  for
the deviations which undermine his confidence  in his original
judgments  and if the conception  presented yields  a judgment
which he finds he can now accept....  [T]he best account of
a person's sense  of justice is not the one which  fits his judg-
ments  prior to his  examining  any conception  of justice, but
rather  the  one  which  matches  his  judgments  in  reflective
equilibrium  ....  [T]his state  is  one  reached  after a person
has  weighed various  proposed  conceptions  and he has either
revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast
to  his  initial  convictions  (and  the  corresponding  concep-
tion) 164 [or made mutual adjustments in both convictions  and
conceptions] .15
Can we see  the courts  as arbiters  in such a process  at a public level?
Could a theory like Rawls' serve as the initial matrix for this process-
as the provisional  "conception"  which is thenceforth  dialectically to be
brought  into  harmony  with  the  network  of  "considered  judgments"
reflected  in statutes, customary forms of social behavior,  constitutional
texts  and historical traditions  (including  those  concerned  with the  in-
tent of the  framers)?  The  answer  to  the latter  question  depends  en-
tirely  on how successfully  Rawls  has been able  to do what  he  set out
to do.
To  some  this  will  seem  (as  it does  to  me  at  times)  an  utterly
trivial  thesis, without  explanatory  power  or  practical  significance.  Its
triviality seems  to turn  on how fanciful  one  finds the  notion  (I  have
swings of mood about it) that there will someday appear some specula-
tive  moral  theory  which  displays  both  sufficient  incisiveness  to  con-
tribute toward the solution of testing cases,  and sufficiently  persuasive
and accessible  coherence  with latent  popular  morality  to  deserve  ju-
dicial recognition. At the very least, the thesis may counsel  skepticism
164 RAwLs 48.
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toward any insistence that the legal and moral orders are, logically and
intrinsically, worlds  apart, separated if not by a void then by an ether
through  which  (at  most)  only  occasional  and inarticulate  influences
can pass. It  denies that adjudication  is a process inherently incapable
of handling the kind of stuff of which moral philosophy is made,  much
as our intuitive arithmetical  imagination  cannot handle numbers  com-
pounded of the square  root of minus-one. It  suggests that the difficulty
we  experience  is not with  the logical possibility  of  interlacing  moral
speculation  and  law, but with the state  and condition  of moral theory
itself-a state  characterized  by complexity  causing  inaccessibility  and
irresolvable controversy. Who dares predict that this state  can ever be
transcended?  Not I; at least not now. But I will confess that Professor
Rawls persuades  me to keep my mind open.